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Introduction 
Speculation on the nature of the soul and the precise parameters of the soul-body relationship 
occupied no small amount of the late-antique literary landscape. In particular, Christian authors of late 
antiquity—likely motivated by intra-Christian arguments ranging from the resurrection of the dead to 
Christology—contributed significantly to this literary production, with specific works on the soul 
originating from Tertullian,1 Gregory of Nyssa,2 Gregory Thaumaturgus,3 Augustine,4 and Nemesius 
of Emesa.5 And this brief list only includes dedicated titles on the soul; it does not include the many 
authors who took up the topic of the soul as part of other works. The ‘gnostic’ corpus of Nag 
Hammadi, which includes texts like “Exegesis on the Soul,” provides further evidence that Christian 
readers were interested in the soul as a nexus of philosophical and exegetical instruction.6 Moreover, 
Christians were not the only ones engaged in this debate, as neo-platonic philosophers like Porphyry 
of Tyre,7 Plotinus,8 and Iamblichus of Apamea9 wrote significant treatises that shaped the contours of 
the soul-body debate in late antiquity. 
 The sprawling nature of these questions in late antiquity is not surprising given their deep 
roots in the Greek philosophical tradition. Plato’s Phaedo, Timaeus, and Phaedrus along with Aristotle’s 
De Anima were widely read, and commentaries of these works circulated in the curriculum of 
philosophical instruction.10 By the time a distinctly Christian intellectual tradition emerged (late 
                                                
1 De anima (PL 2.681-798); edition: Quinti Septimi Florentis Tertulliani De anima, ed. by J. H. Waszink (Amsterdam: J. M. 
Meulenhoff, 1947); ET: “A Treatise on the Soul,” in The Ante-Nicene Fathers, Vol. III, trans. by Peter Holmes, ed. by A. 
Roberts, J. Donaldson, and C Coxe (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing, 1885). 
2 De anima et resurrectione (PG 46.11-160); edition: S. Gregorii Nysseni De anima et resurrectione cum sorore sua Macrina 
dialogus, ed. by J. G. Krabinger (Leipzig, 1837); ET: St. Gregory of Nyssa: On the Soul and the Resurrection, trans. by Catharine 
P. Roth, Popular Patristics Series 12 (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1992). 
3 Ad Tatianum De anima (PG 10.1137-1146). The authorship of this work is dubious, but it is attributed to Gregory; 
ET: “On the Topic of the Soul,” in The Ante-Nicene Fathers, Vol. VI, trans. by S. D. F. Salmond, ed. by A. Roberts, J. 
Donaldson, and C Coxe (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing, 1886). 
4 De anima et eius origine; edition: Sancti Aureli Augustini De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo parvulorum ad 
Marcellinum libri tres; De spiritu et littera liber unus; De natura et gratia liber unus; De natura et origine animae libri quattuor; Contra 
duas epistulas Pelagianorum libri quattuor, ed. by K. F. Urba and J. Zycha, CSEL 50 (Vienna: F. Tempsky, 1913), 303-419; 
ET: Answer to the Pelagians I, ed. by J. E. Rotelle and trans. by R. J. Teske, WSA 1.23 (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 
1997), 465-561. 
5 De natura hominis; edition: Nemesius Emesensus De natura Hominis, Graece et Latine, ed. by Christian Frederic Matthaei 
(Halae/Magdeburg: Gebauer, 1802); ET: Nemesius On the Nature of Man, trans. by R. W. Sharples and P. J. van der Eijk, 
Translated Texts for Historians (Oxford: Liverpool University Press, 2008). 
6 NHC II, 6; edition: “The Expository Treatise on the Soul,” ed. by Bentley Layton, in The Coptic Gnostic Library: Nag 
Hammadi Codex II, 2-7, Vol. 2, ed. by Bentley Layton, Nag Hammadi Studies XX (Leiden: Brill, 1989), 144-168 ; ET: 
“Exegesis on the Soul,” trans. by Madeleine Scopello and Marin Meyer in The Nag Hammadi Scriptures, ed. by Marvin 
Meyer (New York, NY: HarperOne, 2008), 223-234. 
7 Porphyry’s primary work dealing with the soul is On Abstinence; ET: On Abstinence from Killing animals, trans. by 
Gillian Clark (London: Duckworth, 2000). 
8 Plotinus’ discussion of the soul is spread throughout the Enneads; edition and ET: Plotinus, 7 volumes, ed. and 
trans. by A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library, 1968-88). 
9 De anima; edition and ET: Iamblichus’ De Anima, ed. by John F. Finamore and John M. Dillon, Philosophia Antiqua 
92 (Leiden: Brill, 2002). 
10 The most well-known of these commentaries is Alexander of Aphrodisas’ commentary on Aristotle’s De anima: 
Alexander of Aphrodisias: On the Soul, trans. by Victor Caston, Ancient Commentators on Aristotle (New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2012); for a collection of other commentators on the anima tradition, see Richard Sorabji, ed., The Philosophy 
of the Commentators, 200-600 AD: A Sourcebook, Vol. 1: Psychology (with Ethics and Religion) (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2005). 
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2nd/early 3rd century), debates on the soul had moved well beyond a simple Platonic/Aristotelian 
divide, as Epicureans, Stoics, and middle- and neo-platonists refined their positions dialectically. 
Beyond philosophical treatises, the medical writings of Galen also proved to be significant in the 
history of the soul-body problem in late antiquity, which further demonstrates the pervasiveness of 
this issue in the thought of ancient authors.11 Thus, any author of late antiquity who ventured to 
espouse on the soul immediately stepped into a deep quagmire of sources, polemics, and debates.12 
 This no less true of authors who wrote in Syriac than in Greek and Latin. By the time Narsai 
of Nisibis began his homiletical career in the mid-fifth century, there were already competing traditions 
about the soul in the nascent Syriac literary corpus. The so-called “Hymn of the Soul” (or “Hymn of 
the Pearl”) circulated as part of the Acts of Thomas in Syriac,13 Memra 28 of the Book of Steps addresses 
the topic of the body-soul relationship,14 and a significant portion of Demonstration 6 (“On the Bnay 
Qyama”) from the Demonstrations of Aphrahat, the Persian Sage is dedicated to the soul-body 
relationship.15 Moreover, although Ephrem the Syrian did not compose any works specifically on the 
topic of the soul, it is a frequent subject in his hymns, particularly in the cycle known as the Hymns on 
Paradise.16 Narsai’s contemporary, Jacob of Serugh, also addressed the topic of the soul in some of his 
writings.17 Other than Ephrem—who was clearly directly influential on Narsai’s thought—it is not 
certain that Narsai was familiar with any of these previous or contemporary works dealing with the 
soul; but regardless of his awareness of them, Narsai’s thoughts on the soul emerge against a backdrop 
of these pre-existing literary traditions. Like any other author in late antiquity, Narsai’s treatment of 
the soul is embodied within a particular time and place; thus, like any philosopher of late antiquity 
knew, we cannot do justice to the content of Narsai’s thought (the soul) without also attending to the 
context in which it emerges (the body). 
 
Narsai’s Memra “On the Soul” 
                                                
11 Galen addresses the matter of the soul in multiple works, but primarily we can point to his fragmentary The 
Faculties of the Soul Follow the Mixture of the Body (QAM) [also known as The Soul’s Dependence on the Body]; edition: Quod 
Animi Mores Corporis Temperamenta Sequantur, ed. by I. Müller, Scripta Minora II (Leipzig, 1893); ET: P. N. Singer, Galen: 
Selected Works: Translated with an Introduction and Notes (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
12 Althoguh it is certainly not comprehensive and is written apologetically, Nemesius of Emesa provides an 
incredibly useful encyclopedic history of these sources and debates as he saw them. 
13 Edition and ET: The Hymn of the Soul contained in the Syriac Acts of St. Thomas, ed. by A. A. Bevan, Texts and Studies 
V, 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1897). 
14 Edition and ET: The Syriac Book of Steps 3, ed. by Robert A. Kitchen and Martien F. G. Parmentier, TeCLA 12c 
(Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2014), 168-183. 
15 Edition: Aphraatis Sapientis Persae Demonstrationes, ed. by J. Parisot, Patrologia Syriaca 1.1 (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 
1894), 239-312; ET: The Demonstrations of Aphrahat, the Persian Sage, trans. by Adam Lehto, Gorgias Eastern Christian 
Studies 27 (Piscataway, New Jersey: Gorgias Press, 2010), 169-198. I have argued elsewhere that the portion of Dem. 6 
that deals with the topic of the soul (6.14-18) was originally an independent work that was edited together with a 
separate work on virginity when the corpus of the Demonstrations was created. See J. Edward Walters, “Reconsidering the 
Compositional Unity of Aphrahat’s Demonstrations,” in Aaron Michael Butts and Robin Darling Young, eds., Syriac 
Christian Culture: Beginnings to Renaissance (CUA Press, forthcoming). 
16 Edition: Des heiligen Ephraem des Syrers Hymnen de Paradiso und contra Julianum, ed. by Edmund Beck, CSCO 174-175, 
Syr. 78-79 (Louvain: Peeters, 1957); ET: Saint Ephrem. Hymns on Paradise, trans. by Sebastian P. Brock, Popular Patristics 
Series (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1990). 
17 S. P. Brock, “An Acrostic Poem on the Soul by Jacob of Sarug,” Sobornost 23 (2001), 40-44. See also Jacob of Sarug’s 
Homily on the Chariot that the Prophet Ezekiel Saw, trans. by Alexander Golitzin, ed. by Mary T. Hansbury, TeCLA 3 
(Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2016), 553-556. 
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Although the topic of the soul comes up somewhat frequently throughout Narsai’s corpus, there is 
one memra in particular that forms the basis of the present study: Memra 66 “On the Soul.”18 The full 
title of the work is “On the excellence of the soul and how she protects the body, which is her home.”19 
This full title provides a concise summary of the main topic Narsai addresses, namely: the soul’s role 
in guiding and protecting the body. Utilizing classical metaphors (discussed in detail below), Narsai 
compares the soul to a sailor and a charioteer, steering the body to its goal. But for Narsai, the soul 
also struggles to protect the body from the dangers of bodily desires, leading the Christian ascetic’s 
fight against the passions. 
 The memra itself is comprised of 282 couplets. The first ten couplets constitute an anaphora, 
with the first line of each couplet beginning with the word reš: “The beginning of…” This anaphora 
serves as rhetorical introduction to the primary themes of the homily. The very first couplet sets this 
tone: “The beginning of wisdom, true wisdom, is fear of the creator / who, from nothing, created 
everything, visible and invisible.”20 This theme is significant because, although the topic of this memra 
is the body-soul relationship, Narsai constantly reminds his hearers that speculation about the 
composition of human existence should lead to praise of the creator who formed and shaped 
everything. Indeed, in the very first line following the anaphora, Narsai declares, “Everyone owes a 
debt of love to the one who fashioned them.”21 Even in Narsai’s echo of biblical language here—
“created everything, both visible and invisible”22—there is foreshadowing of the discussion of the 
visible body and invisible soul. Thus, with an opening anaphora to set the stage, Narsai invites his 
hearers to contemplate their relationship to the creator as created things.  
 
Narsai’s Depiction of the Soul and Soul-Body Relationship in Context 
There are many ways one could organize a sketch of Narsai’s views on the body and soul. This is 
especially true since the genre of Narsai’s work is a metrical homily, not a philosophical or theological 
treatise. Narsai is not pursuing a single argument or moving logically from one point to the next. In 
poetic fashion, Narsai floats from one topic to another, and he frequently returns to a topic or an 
image multiple times without connecting the dots of every other topic he addresses between them. 
So, recognizing that these categories are arbitrary and somewhat foreign to the way that Narsai 
presents his views, I have nonetheless organized this sketch with the following schema: 1) the origin 
and generation of souls, 2) the qualities of the soul, 3) the soul’s responsibility within the body, 4) the 
fate of the soul at death, and 5) the soul/body relationship as a microcosm for theological issues. 
 In order to take Narsai on his own terms rather than merely derivative of previous authors, I 
have tried to arrange this comparative analysis by letting Narsai’s descriptions of the soul lead the 
inquiry. That is, I do not begin with other authors’ treatments of the soul to see how Narsai compares 
and contrasts with them; rather, I begin with Narsai, allowing his concerns to set the stage for the 
comparison. Hopefully, this arrangement will allow readers to approach Narsai as an original thinker 
who was clearly aware of broader philosophical trends regarding the body-soul problem, but who also 
felt comfortable adapting classical imagery of the body-soul relationship for his own purposes. 
 
                                                
18 The memra number here comes from the “Narsai Clavis” edited by Kristian S. Heal and maitained at: 
https://cpart.mi.byu.edu/home/narsai/memre/narsai-clavis/. In the Mingana edition of Narsai’s works, this memra is 
listed as number thirty-nine (M.II.238-254). 
19 Syr:  ̇ܗ$ܵ% ܿ(ܼ  )ܘ ܼ$ܵ+ܼܐܕ ./ܵ0ܼ ܿ1ܼ2 34ܵ5/ ܿ1ܼ6 37ܵ ܿ8ܼ+ܼܐ ܼܿܕܘ 39ܵ1 ܿ5ܼܕ : ܼܵܬܼܘܪ$ܿ ܿ%ܼ6 = ܿ>ܼ; M.II.238. Note: following the grammatical gender of Syriac, in 
this article I translate all pronouns referring to the soul as feminine. 
20 66.1-2; M.II.238.4-5: 3@ܸAܼ ܼܿܘ 34ܸBܼ ܼܿܕ ܡܸDܿEܸ@B . ̣/ܵ(  ܡ ܼDܿ6ܸ 32ܵ G6̣ܕ : 3+ܵܿܘ/(ܵ =%Iܹܕ ܼ)̄ KܵLMܼN $ܼ ܿEܼ8ܼIܸ ܼKܵE8ܼIܸ ܫܹܪ. The first line is likely an 
intentional allusion to the language of Prov. 9:10, “The beginning of wisdom is the fear of the Lord.”  
21 66.21-22; M.II.238.17-18: P7ܹ7ܵN ܿ$ܼE2 Q7ܵ@B Rܼ  ܵ% ܿIܼ 3(ܵMܼIܵ  $݂ ܿ(݂MIܵ. 
22 Cf. Col. 1:16, though it is worth noting that Narsai does not use the same wording as the Peshitta. 
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1. The Origin and Generation of Souls 
Narsai’s description of the origin of the soul is rooted in the exegesis of Gen. 2:7, “then the Lord God 
formed man from the dust of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and the man 
became a living being” (NRSV). Narsai makes the connection between God’s breath in the creation 
of Adam and the origin of the soul twice in this memra. In the first example, Narsai is explicit about 
the connection between the breath and the spirit: “First the great fashioner forms a figure of limbs / 
and then breathes into to it the living spirit, and it becomes a soul.”23 The second example is less 
explicit about God’s breath becoming the soul, but even here the connection is fairly clear:  
ܡ ܼܵܕTܵ2 = ݂
ܿUܼAܼ ܼܿܕ 35ܵDܵNMܼV ̇ܘܵܗ ̤ܘܗ Dܼ ܿBܼ Mܼ+̤ܘܗ  : 
܀ : ܼܵܬMܼ% ܿIܼ ܚܼܘܪ )M̈
ܿVܼ ܿTܼ( [ ݁ܿVܼܵܐܘ ./ܵ0ܼ ܿVܼ =ܹU̇ ܼAܵܕ   
 ܼR ܿBܼ ܼܿܪ$ܼ6ܸܕ 36̇ ./ܵ0ܼ ܿ1ܼ( ./ܹ(ܵ ܼKܵ% ܿIܼ 3Iܼܵܘܪ  :  
܀ ܗܹܬܼܘܼܬMܿ%Eܵ( : ܹ̈ܬMܿ%6̇ 32ܵ 3 ܹ̈% ܿIܼ G%ܼ9İܵܪܘ   
That is, when [God] gave the command that formed Adam, 
he formed the body and breathed into his face the living spirit.24  
The breath creates life in the body when it is formed, 
and life germinates immortality in its mortality.25 
Although Narsai does provide an extended exegetical discussion of Gen. 2:7, it is quite clear that he 
associates the origin of the soul with the breath of God.  
 In this exegetical conclusion, Narsai joins a chorus of early Christian and Jewish exegetes. 
Philo of Alexandria, for example, claims, “the soul originated from the Father and ruler of all, for that 
which [God] breathed into [humanity] was nothing other than Divine breath.”26 Likewise, the author 
of 4 Ezra also makes this link: “[A]nd it [i.e. the dust/ground] gave to you Adam, a lifeless body. And 
yet, he was the work of your hands, so you breathed into him the breath of life (3%Ïܕ 3Iܘܪ ), and he came 
alive before you” (4 Ezra 3:5). The explicit link between the soul and the breath of God is also seen 
quite clearly in the Targum translations of Gen. 2:7. Targum Onqelos renders it thus: “And [God] 
breathed into [the nostrils] of his face the breath of life, and it became in Adam a spirit uttering 
speech.”27 And Targum Ps.-Jonathan reads, “And [God] breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, 
and the breath became in the body of Adam a spirit capable of speech, to give light to the eyes and 
hearing to the ears.”28 Finally, the midrashic interpretation of Gen. 2:7 in Bereshit Rabbah also makes 
this claim even more directly: “This [i.e. ויפאב חפיו] teaches that [God] set him up as a lifeless mass, 
reaching from earth to heaven and then infused a soul (המשנ) into him.”29 These citations suggest that 
the explicit link between the soul and the breath of God was already well established in Jewish exegesis 
at an early period. 
                                                
23 66.149-150; M.II.242.9-10:  Q1ܸ7 ܿ2ܼ  : ܹ̇ܘܵܗܘ : ܼܵܬMܼ% ܿIܼ ܚܼܘܪ P(ܹ  ̇[ܿ1ܼ5ܵ GBܸܘ : .]ܹ+ܵ ܼܿܨ  ܿܒ
ܼܿܪ ܡ ܼDܵNMܼ2 ܪ
ܼܿܐܵܨ 3 ܹ6̈ܿܕ ܼܿܗ `2ܸܨ. 
24 The latter part of this quote is a word for word citation of Gen. 2:7 according to the Peshitta.  
25 66.173-176; M.II.242.24-243.2. 
26 Philo, On the Creation of the Cosmos, 18.134-135; cf. Philo, Questions and Answers on Genesis, I.4. 
27 ללממ חורל םדאב תוהו ייחְד אתמשנ יהופאב חפנו. Aramaic text from Moses Aberbach and Bernard Grossfeld, Targum 
Onkelos to Genesis (Hoboken: Ktav Publishing, 1982), 29; English translation from Bernard Grossfeld, The Targum Onqelos 
to Genesis, The Aramaic Bible 6 (Wilmington: Michael Glazier, 1988), 44. 
28 ןינדוא תותצמלו ןיניע תורהנאל אללממ חורל םדאד אפוגב אתמשנ תווהו ייחד אתמשנ יהוריחנב חפנו. Aramaic text from E.G. 
Clarke, et al, Targum Pseudo-Jonathan of the Pentateuch: Text and Concordance (Hoboken: Ktav Publishing House, 1984), 2; 
English translation from Michael Maher, Targum Pseudo-Jonathan: Genesis, The Aramaic Bible 1B (Collegeville: Liturgical 
Press, 1992), 22. 
29 BerR 14.8; Midrash Rabbah: Genesis I, trans. by Rab. H. Freedman (New York: The Soncino Press, 1983), 116.  
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  The exegetical link between God’s breath and the origin of the human soul also appears in a 
variety of early Christian texts, ranging from Tertullian30 and Irenaeus31 to “gnostic” texts.32 Likewise, 
a variety of Christian authors of late antiquity, in both Greek and Latin, also link the origin of the soul 
with the exegesis of Gen. 2:7, including Gregory Nazianzus,33 Gregory of Nyssa,34 John Chrysostom,35 
Ambrose,36 and Augustine.37 More immediate to Narsai’s context, we may also consider Aphrahat, the 
Persian Sage, who draws a direct link between the human soul (K%7915 3Iܘܪ ) and the breath of God.38 
Given the prominence of this exegesis in both Jewish and Christian sources, particularly in the 
Aramaic and Syriac traditions, it is not surprising that Narsai’s views of the origin of the soul are so 
clearly tied to the language of Gen. 2:7. 
 Narsai’s reading of Gen. 2:7 may also provide the foundation for his depiction of human 
composition as bipartite, comprised of body and soul. For Narsai, the soul and body are intimately 
intertwined, to the extent that neither is complete without the other: 
)ܘDܵaܵ@(ܸ G6̣ ܡܸDܿ6 ܪMܿaabܸܬܕ 3+ܵc
ܿ6ܼ /%Aܹ 32ܵ  : 
܀ Ṗ+ܹDܼaܵ@(ܸ G6̣ ܡܸDܿ6ܸ )ܘ$ܵ%
ܿ2ܼ ̤ܘܗ ܦܵܐܕ 3EܵBܼ ܼܿܐ   
3@ܵB GNܸ$ܼ ܿ6ܼ ܢMܿ5ܸܐ GNܸܼܬ ܼܿܐ 39ܵ5ܵ/ ܿ(ܼ Dܼ ܿIܼ  : 
܀ Pܹ0ܿ@Vܸ Dܼaܵ@(ܸ 39ܵ5ܵ
̇̄ܐ ܼܬMܼ0ܿ@Vܸ 3@ܸ6 ܿ$ܼ96ܸ   
 ܼ̄) 3%ܵ ܿIܼ ܢ ܸܐ 3EܵB 39ܵ1 ܿ5ܼ ܼ)̄ 39ܵ5̄ܵܐ ܼܬMܼ0ܿ@Vܸ  : 
 3Eܵ% ܿNܼ$ܼ6ܸ 32ܵܘ  ܀ 3EܵLMܼA Dܼaܵ@(ܸ ̇ܗ ܼܵܬܼܘܪMܿabܵ 
For it is not possible for [the soul] to do anything without [the body] / 
just as [the body] is nothing without her. 
The creator of everything constructed them as one person / 
Neither half of the person is complete without the other. 
One half of the person is soul, to the extent that she is alive / 
and her activity does not exist apart from the body. 39 
Narsai does not explicitly mention any other theory of human composition, but it is clear that he 
stakes a claim on bipartite composition. Here, too, Narsai appears to be in concert with the early Syriac 
tradition, which depicted humans as body and soul without a third component.40  
Nemesius of Emesa also provides a helpful reference point here. In his treatise on the soul, 
On the Nature of Man, Nemesius argues in favor of a bipartite human construction.41 Nemesius’ 
argument is useful because he provides examples of people who teach other theories. Namely, 
Nemesius credits Plotinus with distinguishing between soul (ψυχή) and mind (νοῦς), which produces 
a tripartite division. Furthermore, Nemesius argues that Apollinaris of Laodicea follows Plotinus in 
                                                
30 On the Soul 3.4. 
31 Adv. Haer 5.1.3. 
32 E.g. Apocalypse of John (II.19.22-28), Hypostasis of the Archons (88.3-5), and Trimorphic Protennoia (45.28-29). 
33 On the Soul (PG 37:446-456), poem 1.1.8. 
34 On the Origin of Man; On the Creation of Man 28.1-29.1. 
35 Homilies on Genesis, 12.15 (PG 53:103); cf. Homilies on Genesis 13.9. 
36 On Isaac and the Soul 2.4. 
37 Two Books on Genesis against the Manichaeans 2.8.10. 
38 Dem. 6.14: “For in the first birth [humans] are born with a natural spirit (K%7915 3Iܘܪ ) which is created within a 
person and is not subject to deah, as it says, The man became a living soul,” Lehto, Demonstrations, 192. 
39 Memra 66.487-492; M.II.251.19-23. 
40 Cf. Aphrahat, Dem. 6.14-19; see also Book of Steps, Memra 29.1: “According to the nature of his creation, a person 
is body and soul only,” The Syriac Book of Steps 3, trans. Robert A. Kitchen and Martien F. G. Parmentier, TeCLA 12c 
(Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2014), 158. Note: both Aphrahat and the Book of Steps speaks of the spirit as something 
that indwells people from God, but it is clearly not a third component of human composition.  
41 On the Nature of Man, I.1; this argument is, in fact, the starting place of Nemesius’ treatment of the soul. 
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this regard, which then becomes the basis for his Christological claims regarding Christ’s mind. The 
fact that Nemesius argues in favor of bipartite human composition as an explicitly anti-Apollinarian 
argument provides some extra context for Narsai’s claims, given that Apollinaris’ arguments regarding 
Christ’s divinity were so contemptible among the Antiochene exegetes. 
 Narsai also employs the exegesis of Gen. 2:7 as the basis for his claims about the generation 
of souls following the initial creation of the soul in Adam. Narsai highlights the order of events in 
God’s creation of humanity: “First, the Divine Will composed a body in the formation of humanity 
/and after a time, he formed a soul and deposited it within [the body].”42 This order, then, is re-enacted 
with every human being. First a body is created, and then it is imbued with a soul:  
 ܼܵܕܵܐ GNܼܵܘ$ܼ( Ṗ7ܵNܼܵܘܬ : ̤ܵܘܗ ./ܵ0ܼ ܿVܼ ܪ ܿ$ܼ(ܵ  ܡ: 
܀ ./ܵ0ܼ ܿ1ܼ(ܼ ܼܿܘ Ṗ(ܵ ܡMܿ%@B .ܹܕܵܪ 34ܵ8ܼ ܿfܼ ̇ܘܵܗ ̤ܘܗܘ   
.]ܹ+ܵ ܼܿܨ ܿܒ ܼܿܪ ܡ ܼDܵNMܼ2 ܪ
ܼܿܐܵܨ 3 ܹ6̈ܿܕ ܼܿܗ `2ܸܨ  : 
܀ Q1ܸ7 ܿ2ܼ : ܹ̇ܘܵܗܘ : ܼܵܬMܼ% ܿIܼ ܚܼܘܪ P(ܹ [̇
ܿ1ܼ5ܵ GBܸܘ   
 ܼKܵ%7ܵIܼܵܘܪ . ܼDܵ+ܼT( /
ܿNܼܵܙ ./ܵ4(ܸܕ Kܵh ܿ5ܼ  : 
܀ 39ܵ1 ܿ5ܼ G6̣ =aܸ2 35ܹMܵAܿi ܼܿܐ j+ ܼܿܐ P2ܹ ܣ/ܹܵV GBܸܘ   
3 ܼBܵMܿ9Iܸ M ܼ0ܵ(   39ܵ1 ܿ5ܼ ./ܹ ܵ(ܼܘ ./ܵ0ܼ
ܿVܼ RܼܵBܼ ܿ/ܼ6: 
܀ 38ܵ9hܸ( Ṗ ̣Eܵbܵܘ $ܼ%ܼL/ܵ( . ̣/ܵ(ܼ ܼܿܕ 3EܵBܼ
ܼܿܐ   
… 
ܢ ܼܿܬMܼ@%ܼUܼ0ܼ ܿ(ܼ l9ܵ@B ܙ/ܸ8ܼ ܿ6ܼ P@ܹ% ܿIܼ ܼܬMܼ(ܿ ܼܿܪ  : 
܀ ܡMܿ%@B : ܹ̇ܘܵܗܕ 39ܵ1 ܿ5ܼܘ ./ܵ0ܼ
ܿVܼܕ 37ܵNܸܵܘܬ Dܼ ܿ%ܼ(   
Her creation was after the body in the construction of Adam, 
and this same order continues every day in her and the body. 
First the great fashioner forms a figure of limbs, 
and then breathes into it the living spirit, and it becomes a soul. 
He wove a garment of flesh with a spiritual hand, 
and then laid it over the soul like purple garments. 
In the darkness he constructs the body and creates the soul, 
just as when he created creation and placed it in the darkness. 
… 
The greatness of his power is constantly proclaimed in our fashioning, 
within the formation of the body and soul, which happens every day.43 
Narsai thus makes it very clear that the order (348f ) of Adam’s creation is a pattern that is repeated 
for every human being. In fact, this is a sign of God’s ongoing work in the world: a miracle that 
humans witness in everyday life, a reenactment of creation in every impregnated womb. 
 Moreover, Narsai argues in favor of creatio ex nihilo for each and every soul: “Her nature comes 
into being from nothing / insofar as she is similar to angels and spiritual beings,”44 and further: “The 
souls came into being from nothing; in the beginning, they came into being / and from nothing their 
existence arises in all generations.”45 In other words, Narsai claims that every soul in every single 
human being is an act of creatio ex nihilo, which seems to preclude the possibility of pre-existent souls 
(although he does not say this explicitly). 
Narsai distinguishes between the ongoing generation of bodies and souls thus: bodies can 
reproduce themselves; souls cannot. This is, in fact, by design. Narsai tells us that when God 
                                                
42 66.127-128; M.II.241.20-21: ܗMܹ ܼ0ܵ(  ./ܸ9 ܿ6ܼܘ 39ܵ1 ܿ5ܼ ܪ ܼܿܐܵܨ 37ܵ(ܼ ܼܿܙ ܪ ܿ$ܼ ܵ(ܼܘ : 39ܵ5̄ܵܐ GNܼܵܘ$ܼ( :mܵ6ܸܪ  ܼRܸBܿ ܿ/ܼ6 ܡ ܼDܵNܵMܼ2 ./ܵ0ܼ
ܿVܼ. 
43 66.147-154, 157-158; M.II.242.8-15. 
44 66.141-142; M.II.242.4-5: 3%ܹ7ܵIܼܵܘiܘ  .]ܹ%ܼ>ܕ  ܵK7%ܵĪܐ  ̇P+$ܹ+ܼܐ ܢ ܸܐ 3EܵB : 37ܵNܼܵܘܬ  ܼܬMܵ2  ̇P7ܵ%ܵB : ܹ̇ܬܵܐ ܡܸDܿ6ܸ 32ܵ G6̣. 
45 66.145-146; M.II.242.7-8: .iܹܵܕ  ܢܿܘP@8ܼ(  ̇P+ܵܵܘܗ .ܹܕܵܪ ܡܸDܿ6ܸ 32ܵ G ̣6ܘ : ܘ ̤ܵܘܗܵܕ  ܼ$%ܼL/ܵ( 37ܹIܼܵܘi ܘ ̤ܵܘܗ ܡܸDܿ6ܸ 32ܵ G ̣6. 
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constructed the body, God placed within that body a seed with the purpose of reproducing other 
bodies, but the soul has no such seed: 
3EܵLMܼA l ܿ(ܼ/ ܿEܼ( 3>ܵܪ ܼܿܙ ܡܹṪbܵ ܼKܵbܸܐ$ܼ ܿLܼ j+
ܼܿܐ  : 
܀ 3@ܵ@ܵBܼMܼL ܼܬMܵ2 37ܵ%ܵ7(ܸ j+ ܼܿܐ P2ܹ ܼܓܸܪ ܿDܼ6 ܼܿܘ   
: ܹ̇ܘܵܗ GܸBܿ
ܼܿܐܘ ./ܵ0ܼ ܿ1ܼ2 3>ܵܪ ܼܿܙ : ܹ̇ܘܵܗ :ܵܐMܿ@6  : 
܀ ./ܵ0ܼ ܿ1ܼ2 3 ܹ6̇ ܼܵܕܕ ./ܵ0ܼ
ܿVܼ 3 ܹȧ+ܵ ./ܵ0ܼ
ܿVܼܕ P7ܹ6ܸܘ    
: ܼܵܬ/ܹĪܐ 3>ܸܘ ܼܵܬܕ 3>ܵܪ ܼܿܙ Ṗ2ܵ $ܿ%
ܿ2ܼ 39ܵ1 ܿ7ܼ2  : 
 ̇ܗܵܐMܿ@E ܿ(ܼ M2ܵܘ  M ܼ0ܵ( Ṗ7ܵ%ܵB 3 ܹȧ+ܵ 3 ̈6ܹܵܕ ܼܿܗ 
Like a foundation, he put a seed in the inner part of the body, 
and proceeded gradually [to build] him, like a building, unto completion. 
The matter became a seed for the body, and then it came into existence, 
and from that body sprouted [another] body that resembles the [first] body. 
As for the soul, there is no seed that produces another [soul], 
and it is not in her matter that her nature sprouts within [its] limbs.46 
 
And again elsewhere: 
 ܼM@%ܼUܼ0ܼ ܿ(ܼ l9ܵ@B G+ ܹṁIܵ 3(ܵ
ܼܿܪ .ܵܪܗ ܼܿܬ  ܢ ܼܿܬ: 
܀ 3>ܹi ܼܿܙ MAܵ G6̣ 39ܵ5̄ܵܐ ܼܬMܼ6Dܼ ܿ(ܼ 39ܵ5̄ܵܐ G% ܹȧ+ܵܕ   
39ܵ5̄ܵܐܕ 3>ܵܪ ܿTܼ( 39ܵ5̄ܵܐ G%6ܹ/ ܿ6ܼܕ 3>ܵܪ ܼܿܙ G+ ܹṁIܵ  : 
܀ 3hܵ%ܼUܼL 35ܵT6̇ : ܹ̇ܘܵܗ jܹV̇ܵܗ 34ܸ(ܼ ܼܿܘ o%ܼL Dܼ ܿBܼܘ   
We constantly see a great marvel in our fashioning, 
for a human sprouts forth in the image of a human from the inner seeds. 
We see the seed, which a human sows into the earth of a human, 
and although it is contemptible and despised, it turns into a glorious vessel.47 
Thus, Narsai’s theory of the generation of the soul requires God’s ongoing creative activity. Bodies 
can, of course, reproduce, but God alone can create a soul. Human reproduction, then, is an occasion 
to reflect on the wonder of human composition and God’s elegant design of the human form: “The 
greatness of [God’s] power is constantly proclaimed in our fashioning.”48 For Narsai, then, this theory 
of the generation of souls is not mere philosophical speculation; it is a sign of God’s care for humanity 
and God’s activity in the world that should lead humans to glorify their creator. 
 Once again, Nemesius provides an important point of reference for Narsai. In this case, 
however, Nemesius disagrees with Narsai’s conclusion. Nemesius rejects the idea that the body was 
created before the soul: “It would be a perversion of the truth, however, if one were to suppose that, 
because the soul was put into the body after the body had been framed, therefore the soul was created 
after the body. Moses does not say that the soul was created at that moment at which it was put in the 
body, nor would it be reasonable to suppose it.”49 In other words, Nemesius rejects the exegesis upon 
which Narsai bases his claim. For Narsai, it is self-evident that the creation of the soul follows the 
creation of the body because that is the order in which they appear in the text. Nemesius, for his part, 
rejects this position on a priori grounds because he believes all souls were created as part of the pre-
material creation. Moreover, Nemesius makes his argument within a polemical context against both 
Eunomius and Apollinaris. Nemesius critiques Eunomius for teaching that the creation of souls after 
bodies would imply God’s ongoing creative activity in the world, which Nemesius rejects based on 
                                                
46 66.133-138; M.II.241.24-242.2. 
47 66.165-168; M.II. 242.19-22. 
48 66:157; M.II. 242.14-15: ܢ ܼܿܬMܼ@%ܼUܼ0ܼ ܿ(ܼ l9ܵ@B ܙ/ܸ8ܼ ܿ6ܼ P@ܹ% ܿIܼ ܼܬMܼ(ܿ ܼܿܪ . 
49 Nemesius, On the Nature of Man, 2.17; Telfer, Cyril and Nemesius, 282. 
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Gen. 2:2.50 Thus, it appears that, at least in principle, Narsai and Eunomius shared a common belief 
regarding the ongoing generation of souls51—a position that Narsai’s fellow Antiochene, Nemesius, 
explicitly rejects. Clearly, then, there was not necessarily a consensus position on this matter within 
the Antiochene tradition.  
According to Gregory of Nyssa, Macrina provides an interesting middle ground on this topic: 
she argues against both pre-existent souls and the idea that souls are formed after the body. For 
Macrina, the soul must be created at the precise moment that the bodily embryo begins to form.52 
Thus, for Macrina, neither the body nor the soul can precede the other. Against Apollinaris, Nemesius 
levels the claim that he teaches that souls reproduce themselves, just as bodies do.53 Narsai also 
explicitly rejects this claim, and the fact that Nemesius attributes the idea to Apollinaris may explain 
why Narsai is so adamantly opposed to it. Indeed, we may justifiably assume that Narsai’s insistence 
that souls do not reproduce by means of a “seed” the way that bodies do is possibly part of a broader 
anti-Apollinarian polemic.  
 It is also worth noting that Christians were not the only ones who disagreed with one another 
on the timing of the creation of the soul and when the soul enters the body. Iamblichus offers a 
succinct summary of the various philosophical explanations for when and how the soul enters the 
body.54 And, indeed, there is some overlap between the Christian and non-Christian debates on this 
matter; according to Iamblichus’ account, non-Christian philosophers also debated whether the soul 
was generated by means of the seed in the act of reproduction. 
  
2. The Qualities of the Soul 
Having established Narsai’s view with respect to the origin and generation of souls, we can now 
consider the qualities that he ascribes to the soul. There are three primary aspects of the soul’s activity 
that stand out in this memra: control of bodily senses, the capacity for speech and reason, and 
creativity/artistry. 
 Through a series of evocative poetic images, Narsai depicts the ways that the soul controls the 
bodily senses. For example:  
3EܵLMܼ0ܼ( Ṗ ̣Eܵbܵ 3 ܹ̈% ܿIܼ . ܸܿܕ/
ܿ6ܼܕ 3aܵUܼ5ܸ ܼܬMܼ6Dܼ ܿ(ܼ  : 
܀ .iܹTVܹ ܠ ܿ$ܼEܸ2 3Lܹ] ܿIܼ 39ܹAܼiܸ G%ܸAܿ
ܼܿܪ$ܼ6ܸ Ṗ(ܵ   
./ܵ0ܼ ܿVܼ Rܼ ܿBܼ ܿ/ܼ6 ̇ܗ ܼܵܬMܼ@%ܼ@6 ܼܿܕ : ܼܵܬMܼqLܵ Dܼ ܿ%ܼ(  : 
܀ P7ܹ7ܵN ܿ$ܼE ܿ2ܼ ܼKܵ+ܼ ܼܿܕܘܵܬ =Nܵ ܼܒ ܹṖ+ܵ ܥ
ܿ/ܼ1 ܿ6ܼܘ   
Like a spring of flowing life, [God] placed [the soul] within the body, 
through her the dull senses are moistened, so that they produce fruit.  
Through the drinking of her rationality the body is composed, 
                                                
50 “But of souls arrive out of non-existence, then creation is still going on in defiance of the word of Moses, that 
‘God rested from all his works.’” Nemesius, On the Nature of Man, 2.17; Telfer, Cyril and Nemesius, 283-284. 
51 This is not to say that Narsai knew he shared this position with Eunomius, but simply that they happen to have 
come to the same conclusion. 
52 G. Nyssa, On the Soul 9: “For if we should grant that the soul lives in some particular condition before the body, 
we would necessarily have to allow that there is some force in those absurd invented doctrines which settle the souls in 
the bodies through evil. On the other hand, no one with good sense would imagine that the origin of souls is later and 
younger than the formation of bodies, since everyone knows that none of the soulless beings has in itself the power of 
movement and growth. But there is no disagreement or doubt that those which are being nourished in the womb have 
growth and spacial movement. So, the remaining alternative is to suppose that soul and body have one and the same 
beginning. 
53 “The opinion of Apollinarius, on the other hand, was that souls are born of souls, just as bodies are born of 
bodies, because the soul of the first man comes down, with the bodily succession, to all his offsrping. For Apollinarius 
denies either that souls pre-existed or that they are being created now.” On the Nature of Man, II.17 (284). 
54 De anima 31-32. 
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 and it sprouts up and gives the sound of praise to its fashioner.55 
The imagery here is rich: the soul is a fountain, and the body is a tree or plant that ‘sprouts’ from the 
water provided by the fountain. Moreover, aside from its life-giving quality, the water of this fountain 
also ‘moistens’ the ‘dull senses’ so that they are able to produce fruit. The end result—the fruit—of 
the soul’s provision is the sound of praise to the creator. Throughout these lines, Narsai intentionally 
plays with sensory concepts (the sight of a fountain/tree, the taste of drinking from a fountain, the 
sound of praise) to illustrate the soul as the source of sensation. 
 Elsewhere Narsai again vividly depicts the soul’s capacity for sensation and its function in 
governing the body’s senses: 
3ܹ7̈+ܵm ܿIܼ$ܼ6ܸ 39ܹAܼiܸ $̤ ܿUܼBܿ
ܼܿܪ ./ܵ7ܵBܸ j+ ܼܿܐ  : 
܀ 3aܵELܸܘ ܼKܵ@Eܸ( ̇ܗ ܼܵܬܼܘ/+ܼP6 ܼܿܕ 3aܵ(ܼܸܨ $̤ ܿ9ܼq5ܸܘ   
 3 ܵ(ܼMܼ(ܿ ܼܿܐ j+ ܼܿܐ  =ܸUܿ ܿ%ܼ6 36̇MܼV Ṗ2ܵ : ̤ܵܘܗ 3Iܼܵܘܪ: 
 ܼKܵEܵ̈%ܼ4 ܿ(ܼ ܼKܵEܵä5ܸ =Nܵ ̤) P(ܹ ̤ܬ
ܿ/ܼ6ܸܙܘ  : 
30ܹ%ܼAܼi 3 ܹ@̈Nܵ l9ܵ@B ./ܵ6̇ܵܙ 3@ܵ%ܼ@I 3%ܵ7
ܿqܼ(  : 
 ܼܿD ܿhܼ6 ܼܿܘ   P2ܹ 3+ܵ ܼܬMܼ% ܿhܼ( 3 ܹ̈% ܿIܼ ./ܸ8ܼ
ܿ2ܼ  ܿP% ܹ̈% ܿIܼ ܀ 
3 ܵ̈% ܿ@ܼI 3 ܹ@̈Nܵ ܼKܵ%ܼ6 =2ܸ ܿPܼ6 ̇ܗ ܼܵܬMܼ% ܿIܼ ܚܼܘ/(  : 
܀ P(ܹ `ܸAܿܪ
ܿ$ܼ6 ܼܿܕ 35ܵ/ܹĪT ܿ(ܼ /+ܼ$ܼI P@ܹ+ܼDܼ(ܼ ܼܿܕ j+ ܼܿܐܘ   
: ܼܵܬMܼ% ܿIܼ G6̣ܘ 3@ܵNܵ G6̣ m%ܼ@A 3%ܵ7 ܿNܼ j+
ܼܿܐ ̤ܘܗ  : 
܀ : ܼܵܬMܼ% ܿIܼ 3 ̣7ܵN ܼKܵ% ܿIܼ 39ܵ1 ܿ5ܼ P(ܹ ̤ܬ
ܿ/ܼ6ܸܙܕ 36̇ܘ  56 
Like a harp she engages the visible senses, 
and the finger of her skillfulness makes sound in word and in hearing. 
Like a flute transmits wind, it is given a mouth, 
and she sings through it the sound of a pleasant song. 
Through a hollow pipe she constantly sings pleasing sounds, 
and she brings joy to the life of the sorrowful through the joy of her life. 
Through her spirit of vitality, the dead one57 gives praise with sweet sounds, 
and as if it were his own, it is proud that another has made it perceptible. 
It is like a pipe deprived of sound and vitality, 
but when the living soul sings in it, it acquires vitality. 
Again, Narsai creatively employs sensory language, particularly of sound, to illustrate his point. Here 
Narsai invites his hearers to consider the soul as a skillful musician, first as a harp player, then a flutist. 
The image of the harp player envisions the soul controlling the senses by plucking strings—the strings 
of a harp do not move themselves to make sound, they must be played by an external force. Likewise, 
however, even though the soul controls the senses, the soul itself cannot make sounds without a bodily 
instrument. This interrelationship of the soul and body for sensation is seen clearly in the flute image: 
the soul sings through the mouth, and through the hollow pipe. Indeed, the body, apart from the soul 
is “deprived of sound and vitality.” The body needs the song of the soul to live, and the soul needs 
the instrument of the body to sing. 
 In this imagery, Narsai clearly exhibits the Aristotelian view of the body/soul relationship with 
regard to the soul’s dependence upon the body, which, by and large, became the de facto position for 
many philosophers of all “schools” after Aristotle. Whereas Plato had taught that the soul only relied 
on the body as a vehicle, Aristotle argued that the soul was the first actuality (ἐντελίχεια), which 
                                                
55 Memra 66.57-60; M.II.239.22-24. 
56 Memra 66.109-118; M.II.241.8-14. 
57 i.e. the body, which would be dead without the soul. 
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governed the capacity to engage in activity.58 However, while the soul had this potential, it also needed 
a physical body to realize this actuality. That is to say: the soul maintained the capacity for sense 
perception, but it could not actualize this capacity without physical organs connected to a body. Thus, 
Narsai’s depiction of the flute/flute player clearly relies on an assumption that the soul cannot act on 
its potentiality without the means of a body, and indeed this idea undergirds Narsai’s thought 
elsewhere throughout the homily. Even more specifically, the flute imagery also calls to mind 
Aristotle’s discussion of the larynx: “Hence, as we draw breath, the air enters: and so the impact upon 
the windpipe, as it is called, of the air breathed is voice, the cause of the impact being the soul which 
animates the vocal organs.”59 Thus, clearly reliant upon the Aristotelian tradition, Narsai’s imagery 
demands the interdependence of the soul and body. 
 The harp/lyre imagery of the soul originates in the dialogues of Socrates. According to Plato, 
a certain Simmias of Thebes pursued a line of questioning with Socrates in which he asserts that 
bodies, like harps, are “corporeal” (σωµατοειδῆ) and “composite” (σύνθετα) whereas the soul, like the 
harmony (ἁρµονία), is “invisible” (ἀόρατον), “incorporeal” (ἀσώµατον), and “divine” (θεῖόν).60 Socrates 
rejects this argument, though, because—as Simmias notes—this would make the soul too dependent 
upon the existence of the body. In his commentary on De Anima, Alexander of Aphrodisias also rejects 
this analogy and dedicates a somewhat lengthy discussion to it.61 In the Latin tradition, Ambrose of 
Milan also briefly takes up this topic and argues that the soul is not a harmony (harmonia).62 Nemesius 
refers explicitly to the Platonic dialogue and agrees that the soul cannot be thought of as a harmony.63 
Nemesius’ argument is that the soul is a “governor” (ἀρχικός) that rules the body, while a harmony 
does not govern. However, it is worth pointing out the distinction between Simmias’ harmony 
argument and Narsai’s metaphor: Narsai does not claim that the soul is a harmony; rather, in Narsai’s 
image, the soul is the harp-player. This is made clear by his reference to the “finger” that makes the 
sound on the harp. In this regard, Narsai’s use of the metaphor is similar to Plotinus, though the latter 
argues that the ‘harmony’ is specifically the emotional part of the soul.64 Thus, it seems that Narsai 
uses a common trope from soul-body philosophical literature but, like Plotinus, by shifting the 
metaphor to compare the soul to the musician rather than the tune, he avoids the soul-as-harmony 
error that many previous philosophers reject.  
One of the most frequently occurring capacities that Narsai attributes to the soul is 3@%@6  or 
:ܬM@%@6 , the ‘capacity for speech/reason’. This is, of course, related to the issue of the senses. The 
body has the mouth (as we have just seen with the flute imagery), but only the soul has :ܬM@%@6 , which 
puts sounds through the mouth. For Narsai, this capacity for speech/reason is a sign that humans are 
created in God’s image: “[As an] impression in his image, [God] bound within him his creative power 
/ silence in his body, but also the capacity for speech in the formation of his soul.”65 
In classical Greek psychology, the soul’s capacity for reason/speech (λόγος) is one of the 
primary qualities that distinguishes human souls from the souls of other living beings—the distinction 
                                                
58 De anima II.1 (412a27). 
59 De Anima 8.11; Hicks, 89. 
60 Plato, Phaedo 85e-86a. 
61 De anima 24.18-26.30. 
62 On Isaac and the Soul 2.4 (PL 14.529-530). 
63 On the Natrure of Man, II.14.  
64 Enneads 3.6: “But the emotional part of the soul remains in the form of a tune (ἁρµονία). The causes of 
meovement are analogous to the player, and the parts which receive the shocks from emotion night bear an analogy to 
the strings.” Translation from Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, Vol. 1, 183. 
65 66.31-32; M.II.239.5-6: P9ܹ1  ܼܿ5 GNܼܵܘ$ܼ( 3 ܹ@̈@ܵ ܿ6ܼ ܦܵܐ ܗ/ܹ0ܼ ܿ1ܼ( 3Lܹ/݁ ܿIܼ : ܗܹܬMܼ+ܿܘ/ ܵ(ܼܕ 3@ܵ% ܿIܼ P(ܹ ܪܵܨ 3Eܵ2 ܼܿܨ ܼܬMܼ6Dܼ ܿ(ܼ. 
Pre-publication draft—not for circulation 
Please send any comments/corrections to: jwalters@rc.edu 
 11 
between rational souls and irrational souls.66 Moreover, as we have already seen, the Aramaic Targum 
tradition explicitly links the creation of the soul in Gen. 2:7 with the capacity for speech. Nemesius, 
like Narsai, argues that the “rational” aspect of human existence, which distinguishes human nature 
from animals and plants, is proof that humans are created in God’s image.67  
 The same couplet from Narsai cited above also introduces another divine quality that God has 
granted to the soul: creativity or artistry. Throughout the memra, Narsai uses two words for the 
creative ability within the human soul: :ܬM+ܘ/(  and :ܬM76ܘܐ.68 As demonstrated in the previous citation, 
:ܬM+ܘ/(  is an impression of God’s own nature, but it is also a mystery that causes humans to inquire 
into their own nature, and there find God: 
ܗܹܬMܼ+ܿܘ/ ܵ(ܼܕ 3(ܵ ܼܿܪ :mܵ ܿ0ܼ2 P ݂Eܹbܵ P9ܹ1 ܿ7ܼ(  : 
܀ )M̈%ܵ ܿIܼ Gqܵ5Mܼb ̣ܘ̄ܗ . ܼDܵ%ܼUܼ>
ܼܿܕ =B ܠ ܿTܼ95ܸ Ṗ7ܵ6ܸܕ   
39ܵ5̄ܵܐܕ 39ܵ1 ܿ5ܼ : ܼܵܬ
ܵ
]+ܼ$ܼb ܼܿܕ ܼ)̄ :mܵ ܿAܼ $ܼ ܿEܼ%ܼb  : 
 j ܿ%ܼ ܿ4ܼ6 ̣ܘ̄ܗ Ṗ ܵ(ܼܕ  ܀ j ܿ+ܼ ܿ$ܼ46ܸ 32ܵܕ 3+ܵܿܘ/(ܵ =%Iܹ 
 ̇P7ܵNܼܵܘܬ =ܿ>ܼܕ ̇ܗ ܼ$ܵaܵUܼ ܿ(ܼ G%4ܹB 3
̈
%ܵ ܿ4ܼB :ܹܙ
ܵ
īܐ  : 
܀ ̇ܗ ܼܵܬMܼ+ܿܘ/ ܵ(ܼܕ 3@ܵ% ܿhܼ( 32ܸܵܐ G%ܼNDܿ ܿ(ܼ$ܼ6ܸ 32ܵܘ   
In its soul, [God] placed the great treasure of his creativity 
so that everything that is made might request from her [the soul] what is needed for their lives  
The human soul is a treasury of hidden things 
for in it, the infinite power of the creator is contained. 
Hidden secrets are concealed within the inquiry into her formation. 
and they cannot be explored except through the power of her creativity. 69 
So, by implanting God’s own creative abilities within the soul, God grants to humans the ability to 
speculate about human nature as a means by which they might learn something about their creator. 
Narsai returns to this precise theme again later in the memra: 
ܟ ܼܵܬMܼ+ܿܘ/(ܵ 3Eܵ%ܼ8ܿ ܿIܼ 3EܵB ./ܵ+ܵ ܼܿܨ ܿܘܐ  : 
 $ܿ% ݂ܿ@ܼA 39ܵ5ܵ/ ܿUܼ(ܼܼܕ  ܟ ܼܵܬMܼ(ܿ
ܼܿܪ ܀ j̈+ ܼDܵ+ܼܐ Dܼ
ܵUܼa ܿ2ܼ 
P9ܹ1 ܿ5ܼܘ ܗ/ܹ0ܼ ܿ1ܼ( 3Eܵ@aܵ2 t+ܵܬܪܵܨ 3ܵV ܿDܼ(ܼ ܼܿܕ j+ ܼܿܐ  : 
܀ ܗܹܬMܼ%@Aܼ Dܼ ܿ%ܼ( 3>ܵܪ ܼܿܐܘ 3 ܵ̈% ܿEܼL j(ܵ ܢMܿq ܿ(ܼ$ܼ5ܸܕ   
O painter, how wise is your creative power, 
that your greatness is revealed in humanity—the work of your hands! 
As on a tablet, you have depicted the world in body and soul, 
so that heaven and earth might seek you through its revelation.70 
                                                
66 Though later commentators on the classical tradition were by no means in agreement about this. Porphyry, in 
particular, should be noted because he argued that animals did have a rational soul because, regardless of whether 
humans can understand them, they can speak and communicate with their own kind; see Porphyry, Abstinence, 3.3.4; 
3.4.4. Moreover, Porphyry also notes that some birds are even capable of mimicking human speech, which suggests a 
rational soul; Abstinence, 3.4.7. 
67 On the Nature of Man, 1.2-3. Indeed, while recognizing that animals do have varying levels of communication 
abilities, Nemesius argues that humans alone have “articulate speech” (ἔναρθρος διάλεκτος) attached to “thought” 
(διάνοια) and “reasoning” (λογισµός), On the Nature of Man, 1.3. 
68 Generally Narsai uses :ܬM+ܘ/(  when he refers to God’s creative ability and :ܬM76ܘܐ when he refers to the artistic or 
creative ability of the soul. However, there is at least one occasion where he uses :ܬM+ܘ/(  in reference to the soul, so his 
usage of these terms is not a clear distinction of divine as opposed to human capacities. 
69 66.39-44; M.II.239.10-14. 
70 66.353-356; M.II.247.22-248.1. 
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Here again we see the theme, as with :ܬM@%@6 , that God has given particular qualities or abilities to the 
soul that, in turn, make the created thing seek out its creator, in order that it might rightly give praise 
where praise is due. 
 
3. The Soul’s Responsibility Within the Body 
In addition to its capacities and functions that the soul performs within the body, Narsai also provides 
extensive reflection on the soul’s responsibility within the body. Again, like his treatment of the 
qualities of the soul, Narsai’s description of the soul-body relationship relies heavily on creative images. 
For example, early in the memra Narsai uses nautical imagery: 
39ܵUܼ ܿ%ܼ(ܼ ܼܿܕ j+ ܼܿܐ 3Eܵ ܿ+ܼ /
̇ ܿUܼ>ܵ ̇ܗ ܼܵܬMܼ@%ܼ@ ܿqܼ(  : 
32ܵܘ   l ܿUܼ ܿfܼ$ܿ6ܸ ./ܵNMܼ+ ܗ/ܹ0ܼ ܿVܼܕ  ܼ$%(ܹ 32ܹMܼ9̈h ܿ6ܼ ܀ 
j+ ܼܿܐ   ܗܹܬMܼ5/ܵ0ܼ ܿVܼܕ 3ܵ12Tܸ( 3%ܵ2 ܼܿܬ 37ܵ%ܼNܘܹܐ: 
G6̣ P2ܹ ./ܵu ܿ7ܼ6 ܼܿܘ   ܀ = ܿUܼ ܿIܼ$ܼ5ܸ 32ܵܕ 3ܹ7̈%ܵ8ܼ5ܸ 
.ܵܪܗMܼ5 RܼBܿM ܼ8ܵ( 3hܵ@ܵ ܿ6ܼ j+
ܼܿܐ .ܹܕܵܪ ̇ܗDܵ> ܿMܼ2  : 
܀ 37ܵ% ܿLܼ G+TEܹ@ ܿ2ܼ Kܵ+ܼ ܼܿܕ/ ܿ6ܼ =%ܼUܼL P2ܹ :ܵܨܪܵܬ )̤ܘ   
By her speed [the body] crosses the sea as if upon land, 
and the weight of its body does not cause her to sink in the floods. 
Like an anchor she clings, the captain of its corporeality, 
keeping it from injuries, so that it is not harmed. 
Following her direction, it travels like a sailor in the starlight, 
and she navigates the path of [its] journey to a safe harbor.71 
One interesting element of this metaphor is the creativity that Narsai employs to describe the function 
of the soul. Despite the fact that he maintains a constant image of nautical navigation over six lines, 
the body is clearly the boat, but the identification of the soul shifts throughout this chain of metaphors: 
it is speed, an anchor, a captain, and a navigator. It is all of these things at the same time, and it seems 
that Narsai employs this multiplicity of roles intentionally to show just how much the soul does for 
its vessel. By performing each of these roles, the soul navigates its boat toward a safe harbor. 
 The sailor-ship analogy of the soul’s relationship to the body is at least as old as Aristotle, 
though Aristotle does not make significant use of it and in fact neither explicitly accepts nor rejects 
the analogy.72 In his commentary on Aristotle’s De anima, Alexander of Aphrodisias discusses the 
sailor-ship metaphor multiple times in his commentary, and he explicitly rejects it.73 Plotinus also 
discusses the analogy, and although he finds it useful for illustrating that the soul and body are 
separable, he also clearly notes the inadequacy of the analogy.74 
In addition to the sailor-ship analogy, Narsai also compares the soul to a charioteer: 
 ̇P7ܵuܵ2MܼL $ܼ%Iܹܬ )M9ܵAܼiܸ G%ܼ7+ܼDܼB 39ܵBܼ
ܿ
iܼ ܼܬMܼ6Dܼ ܿ(ܼ  : 
܀ ܗܹܬMܼ7+ܼDܼBܼ ܼܿܕ ܼKܵ@>ܸ ܼ)̄ 3 ܿ7ܼ6̇ܕ =ܿBܼ
ܿ$ܼ46ܸ 32ܵܘ   
ܗ/ܹ0ܼ ܿVܼ G6̣ =aܸ2 Ṗ7ܵ%ܵ(ܼܼܨ Rܼ%ܼBܼܪ 3 ܼBܵMܿ%5ܸܗ j+
ܼܿܐ  : 
                                                
71 66.77-82; M.II.240.11-15. 
72 Aristotle mentions this analogy in De Anima II.1 (413a8), where he sets up the quesiton of whether the soul is the 
actuality of the body in the same way that a sailor is of the ship. For more on Aristotle’s indecision on the analogy, see 
Thomas Olshewsky, “On the Relations of Soul to Body in Plato and Aristotle,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 14. 4 
(1976), 400-402. For a more in-depth consideration of Aristotle’s employment of this metaphor, see Theodore Tracy, 
“The Soul/Boatman Analogy in Aristotle’s De anima,” Classical Philology 77.2 (1982), 97-112. For a critique of Tracy’s 
argument and further discussion, see A. P. Bos, The Soul and Its Instrumental Body: A Reinterpretation of Aristotle’s Philosophy of 
Living Nature (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 123-135. 
73 Alexander of Aphrodisias, On the Soul 14.4-5, 15.9-10, 20.26-21.21. 
74 Enneads 4.3.21. 
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܀ ܗܹܬMܼ5/ܵ0ܼ ܿVܼܕ 3ܵ12ܸܐ ./ܵ%ܼh6 3%ܵ ̇(ܼܵܨܕ 38ܵ+T ܿ2ܼܘ   
 =%ܼUܼL 3 ܹ>̈ܘmܵ( 3 ܼ8ܵ%ܼUܼ2 3Nܹ]
ܿaܼ(ܼ ܼܿܕ j+ ܼܿܐ  )M5ܵܵ/݁>Mܼb: 
܀ ܼKܵ ܼ0ܵ%ܼAܼ] ܿ(ܼ = ܿNܼ
ܼܿܬ$ܿ5ܸ 32ܵܕ P2ܹ 34ܵ8ܿ ܿuܼ6 ܼܿܘ   
36̇TNܹ ܼܬMܼ6Dܼ ܿ(ܼ P6ܹMܼ1( 3%ܵ6ܵܪ Ṗ7ܵ6ܸܕ ܼKܵ@6ܸ  : 
܀ ܗ ܹ̈ܬMܵ7ܵ8ܼ
ܿ2ܼܘ P2ܹ ̤ܘܗ 3ܸ8ܿ ܿ5ܼܕ P2ܹ 3(ܵṖ+ܵ M2ܵܘ   
Like horses, its senses are constrained by her authority, 
but it does not understand what is the cause of its constraint. 
Like a charioteer, her will drives on its body, 
and wherever she wills, the boat of its corporeality is directed. 
As if grasping reigns, she guides the path of its actions,   
and she directs it so that it does not stumble in [its] desires. 
A word from her restricts its mouth like a muzzle, 
and does not allow him to harm himself or his companions.75 
The idea behind the imagery here is more or less the same as the previous metaphor, but with the 
added component that it mentions the soul’s control over the senses. This image also depicts the soul 
in a more active role, asserting her will over the body in order to steer and protect it. 
 The charioteer-chariot analogy has its origins in the Socratic dialogues of Plato’s Phaedrus.76 
However, despite the fact that Narsai uses this common metaphor, it is obvious that he employs it 
differently than Socrates. In Narsai’s analogy, it is clear that the soul is the charioteer, the body is the 
chariot, and the horses are the bodily senses. By contrast, in the Phaedrus, the soul is, to some extent, 
the whole combination of charioteer, chariot, and horses; moreover, Socrates contends that the human 
soul is like a pair of unevenly yoked horses, one noble and well trained, and the other wild and difficult 
to control.77 Iamblichus briefly mentions both the sailor-ship and charioteer analogies as common 
ways of explaining the soul-body relationship, but he clearly finds both to be deficient.78 Again, it 
seems clear that Narsai is intentionally using and transforming a classical metaphor of body and soul 
for his own purposes. 
 Both of these metaphors, then, depict the soul in a protective role, guarding the body, guiding 
the body, and leading it through life. But elsewhere in the memra, there is an even more significant 
role that the soul plays: that of champion in the struggle against the passions. Again, as with the 
nautical metaphor, Narsai feels free to play with the imagery as he depicts the way that the soul engages 
against the passions with the body:  
P6̇Mܿ7q ܿ2ܼ ̤) 3uܵ1 ܿhܼ6 3(ܵMܼh(  ̇  ̇PܵVܵܬM9ܵ2 ܼܿܘ: 
܀ KܵLMܼN v@ܵI ܼܿܕ 3Lܼܵܘ$ܿBܼ ܼܿܬ G6̣ ܢMܿV ܼܿܪ$ܼ5ܸ 32ܵܕ   
܀ 3ܹÜLܵMܼh2 ܼܿܘ 39ܹAܼ]ܸ2 3%ܵȧNܵ 3Nܵܘܵܕ ܼܬMܼ6Dܼ ܿ(ܼ   
܀ : ܼܵܬ
ܵ/݁%ܼ%1 ܿLܼܕ 37ܵhܵ2MܼV =ܿ>ܼ ܘ/ ܿ9ܼ ܿBܼܼܬܸܐ M6MܼNܕ   
In love, she urgently exhorts her substance and her partner, 
that it not be deterred from the fight for truth. 
Like a watchman, she cries out to the senses and the thoughts, 
 “Arise and prevail with good works!”79 
                                                
75 66.299-306; M.II.246.12-17. 
76 Phaedrus, 246a-257b. 
77 For an excellent discussion of the unruly horse, see Elizabeth Belfiore, “Dancing With the Gods: The Myth of the 
Chariot in Plato’s Phaedrus,” The American Journal of Philology 127.2 (2006), 185-217. 
78 De anima 33. 
79 66.313-316; M.II.246.21-24. 
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In this image, the soul takes on the role of a coach in an athletic contest, shouting from the sideline 
or, perhaps even more suitable for this struggle, shouting from the corner of the boxing ring, 
encouraging and exhorting the athlete throughout the contest. 
 Elsewhere, Narsai provides an even more complex set of images for the soul’s function in the 
struggle of the passions: 
 ̇P@ܵ% ܿhܼ(    ܼܒ/ܸq ܿ6ܼ ܗ$ܹ ܼ0ܵ%ܼAܼi ܼܿܕ ܹK̈IܼܵܬMܼI `
ܿ>ܼ: 
܀ ܗܹܬܼܘ݂ܬMܿ%6ܵܕ 3 ܹ9̈ ܿhܼ2 3ܹḂܙ Ṗ5ܵܵܪܼܕMܼa(ܼ ܼܿܘ   
: ܼܵܬMܼq+ܼܿܕ ܼܿܙܕ 3 ܹ@̈E
ܿ>ܼ ܢMܿAܼTܵ( ܚ ܿcܼ ܿ5ܼ$ܼ6ܸ Ṗ(ܵ  : 
܀ P7ܹ4ܵ6MܼI v@ܵI : ܼܵܬMܼBܼܵܙ =%ܼ@B P2ܹ 3(ܵṖ+ܵ )̤ܘ   
 ܼ$+ܼT7ܵIܼܵܘܪ .ܵܪ ܼܿܕ Dܼ ܿIܼTEܹ2 P2ܹ 3ܵ1@ ܿ6ܼ ̤)  : 
܀ 3@ܵ(ܼMܼq2 ܼܿܕ ܡ ܼDܵN 3Vܸ
ܼܿܪ$ܼ5ܸ 32ܵܕ P2ܹ 3 ܵUܼUܿ ܿ@ܼ6 ܼܿܘ   
 ̇P5ܵܘPܵ( 3 ܼ8ܵ%ܼUܼ2 : ܹ̈ܬMܿ%6̇ 32ܵ 3 ܹ̈% ܿIܼܕ 3@ܵ%ܼ@B  : 
܀ =ܸUܿ
ܿNܼܘ ܼܒܿܘ/N ܼܿܕ ./ܵUܼ ܿ9ܼ2 ܼܿܕ j+ ܼܿܐ P2ܹ 3 ܼAܵ/ ܿ0ܼ6 ܼܿܘ   
 ܼKܵ ܼ0ܵ%ܼAܼi ܼܿܕ G̈%ܼLܼܘ$ܿBܼ
ܼܿܬ =8ܼ2 Kܵḣ5ܵ PEܹ ܿ>ܼ  : 
܀ ܢܼܘ ܿDܼI ܼܿܬ$ܿ5ܸ 32ܵܕ )M9ܵAܼiܸ 3hܵ9̇6 3 ܹü%2ܹܼܬ
ܼܿܐ j+ ܼܿܐܘ   
Through her power, [the body] contends against the enticements of its desires,  
and with her help, it defeats the sufferings of its mortality. 
Through her, it is triumphant in the contest of the toils of justice, 
and she gives it the crown of victory on account of its endurance. 
She teaches it to take up the spiritual combat, 
and she exhorts it, that it should not stumble before the enemy. 
She holds the immortal crown of life in her mind, 
and she entices it [with the crown] like a child: “come and take!” 
With it, she descends to all the struggles of desires, 
and like an athlete, she anoints its senses, so that they not be taken captive.80 
Once again, it is difficult to nail down the precise role that the soul plays throughout this athletic 
contest metaphor. In some lines, it sounds like a coach or training partner, whereas in others the soul 
is the force that provides the strength by which the body fights. Again, this malleability of the 
metaphor is likely intentional by Narsai: although it is the body that contends against bodily passions, 
it is the soul that does the real work: it motivates, protects, pushes, encourages, and empowers the 
body in which it dwells in order to help it prevail in the good fight. 
 
4. The Fate of the Soul at Death 
One of the most significant questions regarding the soul in antiquity and late antiquity is what happens 
to it at death, and, particularly for Christian authors, whether the soul is re-united with its corporeal 
companion. The first question to consider is what happens to the soul immediately upon death: does 
it remain with the body or depart? Narsai unequivocally argues for the latter: 
:ܵܬM ܿ6ܼ ܢDܵaܸ( Ṗ2ܵ ܦܵܐ G% ܹḣ6̇ 3 ܹ@̈%ܼIܕ 3 ܹ@̈UܼIܸ  : 
܀ ./ܵ0ܼ ܿVܼ MAܵ G6̣ 32ܵMܸa2 ܼܿܕ j+ ܼܿܐ Ṗ2ܵ G+ܼ݂ܕ/fܵ Dܼ ܿBܼ   
 ̇ܗ/ܵ6Mܼ> =ܿ8ܼ+ ܿPܼ2 :ܵܬM6̇ ܠܹṪ>ܵ 3%ܵUܵ ܿLܼ j+
ܼܿܐ  : 
܀ ̇ܗ ܼܵܬMܼ8ܼ%ܼ7Bܼ ܼܿܕ ./ܵ0ܼ
ܿVܼ MAܵ G6̣ Ṗ2ܵ [ ܿ@ܼ ܿ9ܼ6 ܼܿܘ    
./ܵ0ܼ ܿVܼ ܼܬ ܿ/ܼ6̇ ̇ܗ$ܵ% ܿ(ܼ MAܵ G6̣ 3qܵ15ܵ =fܸ/ ܿ>ܼ  : 
 ܵ+M@ܵAܼ j+ ܼܿܐܘ  ܀ 35ܵ/ܹĪܐ .ܵܪܼܬ ܿTܼ2 P7ܹ6ܵ 3%ܵ7 ܿ9ܼ6 Kܵ 
 ̇ܗ$ܵq ܿ1ܼ ܿ6ܼ ܡMܿ%( Ṗ7ܵ%ܵ>ܸܪ G%ܼaf 3(ܵ ܼܿܪ 3@ܵ(ܼܸܐ  : 
܀ 3 ܵUܼ+ܼܗܪ :ܵܬM6̇ P2ܹ =ܸUܿ ܿhܼ6 ܼܿܕ ̇ܗ/ܵ6Mܼ> 3+ܵṁIܵܕ   
                                                
80 66.377-386; M.II.248.14-21. 
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Great travails also appear to her in the time of death, 
when they drive her out from within the body like a child. 
Like a robber, death enters the temple of her habitation, 
and plunders her from within her modest body. 
Stripped naked, the mistress of the body departs from her house, 
and like an exile, she leaves it for another place. 
Her mind bears great grief on the day of her departure, 
because she sees that death has hastily destroyed her habitation.81 
So the soul clearly leaves the body, but where does it go? Narsai addresses this elsewhere: 
 ̇P5ܵDܵ5Mܼ> ܡMܿ%( Ṗ+ܹܕܐܹܨ $ܼ ܹḣ5ܵ .]ܹ%ܼ> G6̣ Dܼ ܿIܼ  : 
܀ 3+ܵܿܘ/(ܵ G6̣ Dܼ%ܼqV ܼܿܕ 38ܵ+ܵ ܿTܼ2 Ṗ2ܵ 37ܸ ܿ9ܼ6 ܼܿܘ   
 ܼKܵ%ܼ7Iܼܵܘ/2 3Iܼܵܘܪ / ܿ(ܼ ܿDܼ6 :Tܵ+ܼ݁ܕ ܼܿܗ j+
ܼܿܐ  : 
܀ ̇ܗ ܼܵܬ
ܵ
]Uܼ ܿIܼ ܼܬMܵ2 3ܹ5̈ܘܵܐ $ܼ%Uܹ2 32ܵT>ܵܕ 36ܵ ܿDܼ>   
G5ܼܵܬ ܼܿܕ 3 ܹ̈% ܿhܼ( Ṗ2ܵ : ̣ܵܘ̄ܗ / ܼܿu̇5ܵܕ 3 ܼBܵT
ܿ@ܼ ܿ6ܼ ̇ܘܵܗ  : 
:Mܹhܵ6 ̤ܘܗ   ܀ 3EܵIܵMܼ5 Dܼ ܿ>ܼ / ܿ+ܼ ܼܿܕܬ 38ܵ+ ܼܿܐܕ Ṗ2ܵ 
 ܼK̈9ܵ1 ܿ5ܼ =B ܼܘ/+ܵ ܿDܼE
ܿ2ܼ ܢDܵ̈%ܼqV 3>ܵܪ ܿTܼ(  : 
܀ P2ܹ ܪ ܼܿܕ ܿ$ܼLܸܐܕ .ܵܪܼܬ ܿTܼ( G+Pܹ76ܸܘ ܢDܹa ܿ(ܼ G+Pܹ76ܸ   
 ܵKLMܼN w ܿEܼI
ܵ
iܕ 39ܵ1 ܿ5ܼ 3+ܵ/Lܵ ܢDܹ> ܼܿܕ .ܵܪܼܬ ܿTܼ(  : 
܀ P7ܹ6ܸ ܠ ܿPܼ2ܕ : ܼܵܬܵܘ
ܵ
iܼܬ ܿTܼ( 3 ܹ2̈Ṁ>ܼܵܕ ܼܿܘ   
ܚܼܘ/( 3 ܹq̈+ܼܿܕ ܼܿܙ G+/ܹL 34ܵ+ ܼܿܕ/
ܿVܼ M ܼ0ܵ(   / ܿ0ܼ1 ܿ(ܼ M2ܵ: 
܀ 36̇ܘܵܪ ܼܬMܼ8ܿ@ ܿ6ܼܕ 37ܵNܼܵܘܬ ̇ܘPܵ2 G%ܼ(݂T ܿ+ܼ$݂6ܸ Dܼ ܿBܼ   
One of the watchers comes down to her on the day of her departure, 
and leads her to where the creator has commanded. 
Like a guide, a spirit guides the spiritual, 
until she enters the lodging place with her companion. 
This angel, who preserved her in this present life, 
shows her where she will dwell until the resurrection. 
All souls are commanded to dwell on earth, 
some of them in Eden and some of them in the place where they are sent. 
In the place of Eden dwell the souls of the lovers of truth, 
and those of the unrighteous [dwell] in places beyond it. 
In paradise the righteous dwell in spirit, but not in body, 
while they eagerly await the construction of the exalted kingdom.82 
According to Narsai’s description here, the soul has an angelic guide to lead her to an appointed place. 
Narsai makes it very clear that souls do not leave Earth; rather, they go to places to await the 
resurrection. The souls of the righteous go to Eden, to paradise. The souls of the unrighteous, by 
contrast, go to some unnamed destination beyond, or outside of paradise. As for what souls do in 
paradise, again Narsai gives an explicit answer: 
3 ܹ9̈ ܿIܼ / ܿUܼ% ܿbܼܕ ܢ ܼ$ܵ9̈1 ܿ5ܼ =B G2ܵT̈>ܵ ܢDܹa
ܿ2ܼ  : 
܀ : ܼܵܬܼܘT%ܼ5 ܼܿܗܕ 3bܵ/
ܿaܼ(ܼ ܼܿܕ j+ ܼܿܐ Gḧ5ܵ G6̇ ܼܿܬܘ   
35ܹ
ܵ
]>Mܼb G6̣ G6̇ ܼܿܬ G%ܵ ̈@݁ ܿLܼ ܼKܵ79ܸ(ܼ ܼܿܕ j+
ܼܿܐ  : 
܀ G+Pܹ(ܼ ܼܿܕ 3@ܵ% ܿIܼܕ : ܼܵܬMܼ@%ܼ@E ܿ(ܼ Ghܵ9̈ ܿIܼ$ܼ6ܼ 32ܵܘ   
37ܸb ܼܿܘ /%ܼ1 ܿLܼܕ 37ܵ%ܵ7>ܸ G6̣ G%ܵ@̈
̈
Lܵ 3@ܵ96ܸ  : 
 ܿMAܼTܵ( GLܵ$ܿ ܿBܼ$ܼ6ܸ 32ܵܘ  ܀ : ܼܵܬMܼq+ܼܿܕ ܼܿܙܕ 3 ܹ@̈E>ܵ ܢ 
                                                
81 66.391-398; M.II.248.24-249.4. 
82 66.417-428; M.II.249.16-24. 
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All souls who endure sufferings enter into Eden, 
and there they rest as if upon a pleasant bed. 
As if in slumber, they rest from [their] actions there, 
and they do not make use of the power of speech that is in them. 
They indeed rest from the toil of good and bad, 
and they do not contend in the struggle of righteous labor.83 
Unfortunately, Narsai does not tell us anything about the souls who are not in Eden. He makes no 
further mention of them. He is clear, though, about what the souls of the righteous do: they rest. 
Indeed, they rest “as if in slumber.” However, it is worth noting that he does not actually say that they 
sleep. Narsai then continues to describe this restful state:  
܀ : ܼܵܬMܼq+ܼܿܕ ܼܿܙܕ 3 ܹ@̈E>ܵ ܢMܿAܼTܵ( GLܵ$ܿ ܿBܼ$ܼ6ܸ 32ܵܘ   
: ܼܵܬMܼ% ܿIܼ G6̣ G+Pܹ(ܼ ܼܿܕ 3@ܵ% ܿIܼ =%ܼu ܿ(ܼܕ : ̣ܵܘ̄ܗ 32ܵ  : 
܀ 3 ܹ@̈6ܸ =ܸUܿ ܿ%ܼ6 3EܵLMܼAܼܕ 35ܵT6̇ )ܘ$ܵ%
ܿ2ܼܕ 32ܸܵܐ   
Q ܿUܼ ܿ+ܼܼܬܸܐܘ mAܵ : ܼܵܬMܼLܿܘ/ܵVܕ 3+ܵܕܸܪ : ̣ܵܘ̄ܗ 32ܵ  : 
܀ 3%ܵqLܸ =ܿ>ܼ x%ܼ7b ./ܵ0ܼ ܿVܼ G@ܵ+ܼܐ )ܘ$ܵ% ܿ2ܼܕ 32ܸܵܐ   
“It is not the case that the power that is in them has ceased from vitality, 
rather, it no longer has a bodily vessel to transmit words.  
It is not the case that the stream of discernment has been cut off and dried up, 
rather, it no longer has a bodily tree that needs irrigation.”84  
That is, Narsai argues that souls do not lose their inherent qualities of sensation and capacity for 
speech; but, the soul is unable to perform these functions without the body. The soul does not lose 
its capacities, but in its incorporeal state it is incapacitated.  
Regarding the fate of souls at death, perhaps the most useful points of comparison are Narsai’s 
predecessors in Syriac literature, namely Aphrahat and Ephrem. Aphrahat is significant in this 
comparison because of the relative idiosyncrasy of his views on the matter. According to Aphrahat’s 
argument in Dem. 6, when a person dies, the soul is buried with the body and sleeps, and the soul 
loses its capacity for sense-perception.85 Subsequently, on the day of the resurrection, both bodies and 
souls are resurrected together. Furthermore, in Dem. 8, Aphrahat expands on this topic, and although 
he refrains from claiming that the souls of the righteous will be rewarded or that the souls of the 
unrighteous will be punished in the time period awaiting the resurrection, he does claim that the sleep 
of the righteous souls will be peaceful while the sleep of the unrighteous souls will be restless.86 It is 
also worth noting here that Aphrahat’s argument is closely paralleled by Macrina’s teaching in Gregory 
of Nyssa’s On the Soul and the Resurrection. Specifically, though Macrina does not say anything about 
sense-perception, she does argue that the soul remains with the body even though the body 
decomposes.87 
In Hymn 8 of the Hymns on Paradise, Ephrem offers a brief reflection on the fate of the soul 
as it awaits the resurrection. Here, Ephrem discusses the relationship of the bodily senses to the soul 
                                                
83 66.463-468; M.II.251.3-6. 
84 66.468-472; M.II.251.7-9. 
85 Dem. 6.14. 
86 Dem. 8.19: “The upright lie down and their sleep is pleasant, throughout day and night. For they do not perceive 
the whole night to be long, but experience it as though it were a single moment. Then, when the morning comes, they 
wake up and rejoice. The sleep of the wicked, however, lies heavily upon them, like a man stricken with a strong, deep 
fever who tosses and turns on his bed, and who is disturbed throughout the long night. They fear the morning, when 
their master will condemn them.” 
87 G. Nyssa, On the Soul, ch. 4. 
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in some detail, and indeed, he finds himself perplexed at thinking that a soul would enter paradise 
while lacking the ability of perception to enjoy it: 
That blessed abode is in no way deficient, 
for that place is complete and perfected in every way,  
and the soul cannot enter there alone, 
for in such a state it is in everything deficient— 
in sensation and consciousness; but on the day of Resurrection 
the body, with all its senses, will enter in as well, once it has been made perfect.88 
Whereas Narsai argues that the souls of the righteous enter paradise and there await the resurrection, 
Ephrem cannot abide this scenario because it implies that souls can enter paradise without their 
bodies. Thus, he concludes that since souls cannot enter paradise without their bodies, the souls of 
the just and righteous dwell in “delightful mansions on the borders of Paradise.”89 
In comparison with his predecessors, Narsai has both similarities and differences—though, 
certainly, he is closer to Ephrem than to Aphrahat. Contra Aphrahat, although Narsai says that souls 
rest, he does not say that the soul sleeps, and he explicitly argues that the soul does not lose its 
capacities. Narsai’s argument is very close to Ephrem’s, except for the clear disagreement on whether 
souls can enter paradise without their bodies.  
 
5. The Soul/Body Relationship as a Microcosm for Theological Issues 
The final component of Narsai’s depiction of the soul-body relationship under examination here is 
his use of this analogy as a microcosm of theological issues. For example, Narsai explicitly states that 
the soul can show us something about the relationship among the persons of the Trinity: 
 ̇P(ܵ/ ܿ9ܼ( P(ܹ $ܼ+ܼܐ : ܼܵܬܼܘ$ܼ+ܼܐ `Lܸܕ 3NܵܵܕMܼ( ܙܵ̄ܪܐ  : 
 ܼ+ܨ $ܼ+ܼܐ ܼ$ܵ%ܼ2ܼܬ ܼܿܘ  ܀ 3@ܵ% ܿIܼܘ ܼKܵ@Eܸ( Ṗ7ܵNܼܵܘܬ / 
3 ܹ6̈Mܿ7N ܩܵܕMܼUܼ2 =%ܼ@ ܿNܼ ܡܸDܿEܸ( Ṗ%ܵ6ܼܘܕ ̣ܘ̄ܗ 3 ܹ6̇ܵܕ  : 
܀ 3Iܼܵܘ/2 Ṗ%%ܹ ܿIܼܘ ./ܵUܼ ܿ2ܼ ̇ܗ ܼ$ܵ@6ܸܘ 3 ܵ(ܼ
ܿTܼ2 Ṗ7ܵ%B   
The mysterious explanation of the name of the Divine Being is in her generation, 
And her formation represents threeness in word and power.  
Her likeness is similar in some respects to the explanation of persons:  
her nature (is like) the Father, her word (is like) the Son, and her life (is like) the Spirit.90 
The soul, then, as the component of humanity upon which God has impressed God’s own image, 
reflects the triune nature of God’s identity. Narsai does not appear to be engaging in a specific 
theological argument here, rather he is simply using his explication of the soul as a way to invite his 
audience to reflect on the mystery of the Trinity. While this example is explicit, there are other 
examples that are less obvious candidates for theological speculation. However, upon close contextual 
examination, it becomes clear that these claims are best understood against the backdrop of the 
Christological controversy. 
 First, it is likely not a coincidence that Narsai’s insists upon the distinction of body and soul, 
and he specifically argues that they are not mixed. For example:  
 ܼܵܬܼܘܪMܿabܵܘ ̇ܗMܵ ܼ0ܵ( Ṗ7ܵ%ܵB  . ܹD̈
ܵUܼa ܿ(ܼ / ܿUܼ2 ̇ܗ: 
܀ P7ܹ6ܸ ܼܒܼܘܬ )̤ܘ Ṗ7ܵ6ܸ ̣ܘ̄ܗ Q+ܼ/V ܼ)̄ Ṗ(ܵ Rܼfܵ Dܼ ܿBܼܘ   
 ̇ܗ ܼܵܬMܼ7%ܼu ܿNܼܕ 37ܵNܼܵܘܬ zܼ+ܼm6 P@ܹ8ܼ( : ̣ܵܘ̄ܗ 32ܵ  : 
                                                
88 Hymns on Paradise, 8.7; cf. 8.9; trans. Brock, Hymns on Paradise, 133-134. 
89 Hymns on Paradise, 8.11. 
90 66.45-48; M.II.239.13-15. 
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܀ 3 ܼAܵܵܙMܼ6 32ܵܕ Ṗ+$ܹ+ܼܐ Dܼ ܿIܼ )̤ܘ )ܘ ܼ$ܵ+ܼܐ Dܼ ܿIܼ ̤ܘܗܕ   
Her nature is within her, but her operation is outward in works, 
And although she is in it, it is distinct from her, and she is also [distinct] from it. 
The construction of her quality is not mixed through all of it, 
It is one, and she is one, without mixture.91 
This language of distinct natures of the soul and body could easily be seen as a sly argument in favor 
of distinct natures in Christ. And the language that rejects mixture coheres well with Antiochene 
writings, which rejected any formula of Christ’s nature that mixed or mingled divine and human 
natures, whether Apollinarian or Eutychian. 
 With respect to the language of “mixture” in the soul-body analogy as an argument about 
Christology, a comparison with other authors is quite useful. For example, in his work “On the 
Incarnation,”92 Narsai’s fellow Antiochene Theodoret asserts: 
We do not say that the soul is mixed with the body, but rather that she is united and conjoined 
[with it], and dwells and works within [it]. Nobody would say that the soul is mortal or the 
body immortal without being entirely in foolish error. So while we distinguish each [nature], 
we acknowledge one living being composed out of these. We name each nature with separate 
names: the former ‘soul’, the latter ‘body’, yet the living being composed out of both we call 
by a different name, for we label that ‘human’. Therefore, taking this also as an image of the 
oikonomia, let us avoid that blasphemy [of the confusion of natures], and abandoning [the 
term] ‘mixture’, let us apply consistently the terms of ‘union’ [henosis], ‘conjunction’ [synapheia] 
and ‘togetherness’ [koinonia], teaching the distinction of nature, and the unity of the person 
[prosopon].93 
There are several points of interest in this quotation, but the most notable is that his primary argument 
is that the body-soul relationship provides an analogy for the unmixed natures. That is, no one would 
be so foolish as to say that soul and body are mixed; so too then would it appear foolish to argue that 
the natures of Christ are mixed. 
 Likewise, Nemesius also offers helpful perspective regarding the language of mixture in the 
body-soul relationship. Taking up the problem of how the soul can be said to be in union with the 
body without resulting in the conclusion that the soul is perishable along with the body or that it 
merely stands in ‘juxtaposition’ to the body it inhabits (both of which he rejects—and he also explicitly 
rejects the mixture of wine and water as a suitable metaphor), Nemesius turns to Ammonias Saccas, 
the teacher of Plotinus for a solution: “[Ammonius] said that it is in the nature of intelligibles both to 
be capable of union with things adapted to receive them…and to remain unconfused with them while 
in union.”94 Based on Ammonius’ argument, Nemesius is able to conclude that “the soul suffers no 
change as a result of union with the body (οὐκ ἄρα ἀλλοιοῦται ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν τῇ ἑνώσει),”95 and even more 
explicitly, “the soul is united to the body, and, further, this union is without confusion” (καὶ ἥνωται 
τοίνον καὶ ἀσυγχύτως ἥνωται τῷ σώµατι ἡ ψυχή).96 Then, just a few paragraphs later, Nemesius 
explicitly links this discussion of the union of soul and body without mixture to Christology: “The 
                                                
91 66.213-216; M.II.244.1-4. 
92 PG 75. 
93 Theodoret, De Incarnatione 34 [32]; PG 75, 1472D-1473A; Quoted in Kupan, Theodoret of Cyrus, 72-73. [Quotation 
slightly adapted.] 
94 On the Nature of Man III.20; Telfer, Cyril and Nemesius, 295. If Nemesius is referring to a specific work of 
Ammonius, that work has not survived. 
95 On the Nature of Man III.20; Telfer, Cyril and Nemesius, 295. 
96 On the Nature of Man III.21; Telfer, Cyril and Nemesius, 296. 
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above arguments would apply even more exactly to the union (ἑνώσει) of the divine Word with his 
humanity, for he continued thus in union without confusion” (ἀσυγχύτως).97 Thus, it is clear that 
Nemesius draws an explicit link between the unmixed union of body and soul with the unmixed union 
of divinity and humanity in Christ. And, in the process of his argument, he quotes both Ammonius 
Saccus and Porphyry as unwitting witnesses to the veracity of his claims.98  
In the Latin West, Augustine also made explicit use of the body-soul analogy for representing 
the relationship of human and divine natures in the person of Christ. Interestingly, although Augustine 
is perfectly content to use language of “mixture” (mixtura), he also specifies how this mixture should 
be explained: 
For just as the soul is united (unitur) to the body in one person so as to constitute man, in the 
same way God united to man in one person so as to constitute Christ. In the former person, 
there is a combination (mixtura) of soul and body; in the latter there is a combination of divine 
and human. Let my reader, however, guard against borrowing his idea of the combination 
from the properties of material bodies, by which two fluids when combined are so mixed that 
neither preserves its original character; although even among material bodies there are 
exceptions, such as light, which sustains no change when combined with the atmosphere. In 
the person of a human, therefore, there is a combination of soul and body; in 
the person of Christ there is a combination of the divine with human; for when the Word of 
God was united to a soul having a body, He took into union with Himself both the soul and 
the body.99 
Augustine frames this use of the body-soul analogy against people who resist this explanation of 
Christology. However, Augustine makes the case that the body-soul relationship is essential to 
understanding the union of divine and human in Christ. Indeed, Augustine argues that if humans can 
grasp that an immaterial soul can be joined to a material body, then it is much easier to believe that 
another incorporeal entity—the Word of God—can be joined to them. 
 Turning back to Narsai, elsewhere he returns to the distinctiveness of the body’s nature and 
the soul’s nature, and again we see grounds for a dyophysite Christology: “The passions of her nature 
and those of the bodily nature are distinct / yet because of love, behold, it is said that they are one 
person.”100 By distinguishing between the passions of the body and those of the soul, it is possible that 
Narsai is laying the groundwork for a theory of the union of prosopa in Christ that would allow for 
the two natures to remain distinct yet intact as one person.  
 In this same quotation, it is also noteworthy that Narsai claims that the soul and body are one 
person “because of love.” This language evokes the prosopic union, the Antiochene synapheia of the 
two persons in Christ, bound together not by nature, but by mutual love. Indeed, elsewhere in this 
                                                
97 On the Nature of Man III.22; Telfer, Cyril and Nemesius, 300. Nemesius does go on to differentiate somewhat the 
soul-body union from the human-divine union, but only to make it absolutely clear that “The Word mingles with body 
and soul, and yet remains throughout unmixed, unconfused, uncorrputed, untransformed, not sharing their passivity but 
only their activity, not perishing with them, nor changing as they change…” III.22; Telfer, Cyril and Nestorius, 301. In 
other words, Nemesius grants that the soul-body is not a perfect metaphor because the soul can be ruled by the body 
and the body can be ruled by the soul, yet he nevertheless maintains that the union envisioned by the soul-body 
relationship where two things co-exist without change to the intelligible thing is at least comparable to the human-divine 
union. 
98 We have already seen the reference to Ammonius; immediately after Nemesius makes this argument explicitly 
Christological, he quotes Porphyry, who argued that one thing can be assumed by another thing without resulting in any 
change; On the Nature of Man III.22; Telfer, Cyril and Nemesius, 301. 
99 Letter 137.11; translation slightly altered from J.G. Cunningham in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 1, 
ed. by Philip Schaff (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) 
100 66.279-280; M.II.245.23-25: ܀  39ܵ5̄ܵܐ ܼܘDܼ ܿIܼܕ G+ܼ/6 ܼܿܐ$ܼ6ܸ :ܵܗ 3(ܵMܼI =u6ܸܘ :./ܵ0ܼ ܿVܼ G%ܵ8ܼ ܿ2ܼܘ Ṗ7ܵ%ܵ8ܼ ܿ2ܼ $ܼ+ܼܐܕ 3 ܹ9̈ ܿIܼ G%ܼ9+ܼ/V. 
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memra we see other language that is reminiscent of this bond: “In love she is bound together with 
[the body’s] senses, as in a yoke.”101 This language of the bond of love is evocative of both Theodore 
of Mopsuestia and especially Nestorius. In the Bazaar of Heracleides, Nestorius explicitly claims that the 
two natures of Christ, while remaining distinct ousia, are “united by love in the same prosopon.” 
 Furthermore, Narsai goes to some length to convince his audience that the nature of the soul 
always has its capacities, from the womb to the tomb. That is, the abilities of the soul do not grow or 
expand, but the soul has the wisdom to only employ its abilities as the body can handle it. For example, 
consider the following: 
 ܼ̄) Ṗ(ܵ    ܼܬ ̤ܵܘܗ ܼܿܕ ܡMܿ+ G6̣ ̇ܗ ܼܵܬMܼ@%ܼ@6 ܼܿܕ ܼKܵ@6ܸ: 
܀ 3 ܹ6̈ܿܕ ܼܿܗ ܼܬMܼ12 ̇ܗ ܼܵܬMܼ@%ܼ@ ܿNܼܕ 3fܵܗ
ܼܿܪ /%ܼ0ܼI ܼܿܘ   
 ܼKܵEܵ̈%ܼ4 ܿ(ܼ ܼKܵEܵä5ܸ =Nܵ / ܿ6ܼmEܸ2 3>ܵDܼ
̇
+ܵ  : 
܀ ̤) ܦܵܐ 3@ܵ%ܼh6 ./ܵ4(ܸ ܼܒMܼ(ܿ ܼܿܐ =%ܼh6 ܼܿܕ 3EܵBܼ ܼܿܘ   
 ̇ܗ ܼ$ܵ+ܵ /7ܵ8ܸ( /%ܼ1 ܿLܼ Q ܿqܼEܸ2 34ܵ8ܼ ܿfܼ ܼ)̄ 3 ܼ8ܵ%ܼUܼ2  : 
 ܿ$6ܸܬܕ 3@ܵİ ܼܵܕܘ  ܀ Gqܵ4̈
ܿVܼ$ܼ5ܸ 32ܵܕ ./ܵ0ܼ ܿVܼ ẅ ܿ7ܼ6ܸ ܚܿܘ 
 ܼM@Bܵ ܿ$ܼEܸ2 : ܼܵܬMܼLܿܘ/ܵVܕ 3@ܵ% ܿIܼ ܼ)̄ 3%ܵ7
ܿNܼ  : 
܀ /%ܼ1 ܿLܼ Q ܿqܼEܸ2 ./ܵ0ܼ ܿVܼ w ܿ9ܼAܼiܸ Ṗ2ܵ G%ܹ7̇>ܵ 32ܵܘ   
3Nܵ$ܼLܸ G6̣ / ܿUܼ2 Ṗ+ ܹm̈
ܿAܼ ./ܵu̇5ܵ $ܼ+ܼTEܵ%ܼ8ܿ ܿIܼ  : 
܀ )M̈4ܵ8ܼ5ܸ ܼܬ/ܹ+ܵܘ ./ܵUܼ ܿLܼ ./ܵ0ܼ ܿVܼ 3ܸ(ܿ
ܼܿܪ$6ܸ Dܼ ܿ>ܼ   
… 
 ̇@bܵ ܗ$ܹ%ܼ(݁ܪ ܼܿܬ ` ܿ>ܼ  : ܼܵܬMܼE% ܿ@ܼ> ܼܿܕ 3 ܼAܵܪ ܿDܼ2 3qܵ:  
܀ : ܼܵܬMܼ@%ܼh6 ܼܿܕ 3 ܼAܵܪ ܿDܼ2 Kܵḣ5ܵ ܗܹܬMܼUܿ% ܿbܼ `
ܿ>ܼܘ   
Its construction from the beginning when it was created is perfect, 
but the body does not make use of its perfection outwardly. 
The word of her rationality is in her from the day that she came into being, 
but the course of her swiftness is restricted by the limbs. 
She knows how to sing a pleasant song, 
but insofar as the bodily flute is weak, she is also weak. 
She understands the order/arrangement to pluck the harp of her existence, 
but she is afraid of stretching the strings [too much], lest they should snap. 
She possesses the power of discernment in order to be confident, 
but the senses of the body do not respond to her [when] she plays beautifully. 
Wisely she keeps her treasure, except for silence, 
until the body grows and the child inherits its possessions. 
… 
With its growth, it rises to the level of its youthfulness, 
but with its old age, it decreases to the level of its weakness.102 
It is not immediately evident that Narsai’s argument here is Christological in nature. However, in the 
Chalcedonian controversy, an exegetical dispute arose over the capacities of Jesus, specifically related 
to the interpretation of Luke 2:52 (“Jesus grew in age and wisdom”). For example, Diodore of Tarsus 
argues that this claim cannot be about God the Word because “he is God, a Perfect One begotten 
from the Perfect One.” Diodore continues, “He, therefore, grew not, for his is not imperfect such 
that he would grow to that which is perfect, but that which grew in age and wisdom was the flesh. 
Neither did the divinity, after [the body] was formed or born, place immediately its entire wisdom in 
                                                
101 66.263; M.II.245.13: ./ܵ%ܼ7(ܼ ܼܿܕ j+ ܼܿܐ )M9ܵAܼiܸ G6̣ M ܼ0ܵ2 37ܵ+ܼDܼB 3(ܵMܼh( . 
102 66.231-240, 245-246; M.II.244.13-20; 245.1-2. 
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it, but rather little by little it gave [it] to the body.”103 Thus, the implication here is that Diodore 
attributes Jesus’ growth to his human nature, not to his divine nature. Theodore of Mopsuestia also 
addresses the interpretation of Luke 2:52 in is On the Incarnation, and his treatment of the passage makes 
it clear that the Antiochenes forged their position on this verse in opposition to the Apollinarians and 
Eunomians. For Theodore, both of these positions fail to properly address the issue of Christ’s having 
a rational soul (K%5$>ܘD+  3915), which seems to contradict Jesus growing “in wisdom.”104 
On the opposite side of the Christological spectrum, Philoxenos of Mabbug rejects an 
exegetical conclusion of this passage that separates the natures. In fact, Philoxenos attributes the 
Antiochene misunderstanding of this verse to the fact that human foolishness cannot comprehend 
the wisdom of God.105 Furthermore, Philoxenos also expands from his exegesis of Luke 2:52 directly 
into a polemic against Theodore,106 which testifies to the contested interpretation of this verse in the 
5th/6th century Christological debates. With the polemical setting of this argument over Jesus’ natures 
in mind, it is easy to see how Narsai’s argument about the soul limiting its activities with respect to 
the body’s abilities might actually be a Christological argument in disguise: namely, that just as the 
divine nature does not “grow” along with the human Jesus (i.e. the Antiochene interpretation of Luke 
2:52), neither do the capacities of the soul grow with respect to the abilities of the body. 
 Finally, on three occasions, Narsai uses the word “passibility” or “capacity to suffer” (:ܬMLM9I), 
and his usage of this term with respect to the soul might be best interpreted as a cipher for the divine 
nature of Christ. Two of the occurrences of the word in particular are worth noting: 
܀ ܗܹܬMܼLMܿ9hܵ( 39ܵ
ܵ
İ 32ܵ Dܼ ܿBܼ )M̈9ܵ ܿIܼ 3%ܵ7̇bܵܘ   
 ܿU ܿIܼ ` ܿ>ܼ 3 ܹ9̇Iܵ ̣ܘ̄ܗ 3(ܵMܼh(  37ܵ%ܵ8ܼ ܿ(ܼ M2ܵ Ṗ ܵUܼ%ܼ: 
܀ 3%ܹ5ܵ
ܵ
]0ܼ ܿVܼ G̈%ܼ9 ܿIܼ =B G6̣ Ṗ7ܵ%ܵB ̣ܘ̄ܗ ܡܵܪܕ   
 She hates his sufferings, even though she does not suffer in his passibility. 
In love, she suffers with her beloved, [but] not in [her] nature / 
for her nature is exalted above all bodily sufferings.107 
./ܵ0ܼ ܿVܼ ẅ% ܿ9ܼ ܿIܼܕ : ܼܵܬMܼLMܿ9hܵ( 3%ܵ8ܿ ܿ6ܼ$ܼ6ܸ 32ܵ  : 
܀ ̇ܗ ܼ$ܵ%ܼ4Bܼ
ܼܿܬ ܫMܼUܼ2 = ܿUܼ ܿIܼ$ܼ6ܸ Dܼ ܿBܼ 3@ܵUܿ ܿIܼ$ܼ6ܸ 32ܵܘ   
“She is not injured in the passibility of the suffering body / 
and she is not destroyed when her outer garment is destroyed.”108 
In other words, the body suffers, but the soul does not suffer within it. Despite the fact that body and 
soul are bound together as one person, the bodily nature experiences suffering, while the nature of 
the soul does not. This language is eerily reminiscent of the way that dyophysite writers speak of the 
human nature of Christ suffering while the divine nature does not. 
 Given the confluence of these various arguments that might undergird dyophysite Christology, 
I think their appearance in this memra is likely not a coincidence. After all, as we have seen, Narsai 
was not the only post-Chalcedonian writer to use the body-soul relationship as a metaphor for Christ’s 
                                                
103 SD 5 (Severus, Extracts from Diodore); Behr, 239; see also the same quotation in Latin: PD 1 (Palatine 
Collection, Extracts from Diodore); Behr, 267. 
104 On the Incarnation, fol. 4; Behr 451-453. 
105 Commentary on Luke, Fragment 48; text: Philoxenos of Mabbug: Fragments of the Commentary on Matthew and Luke, ed. by 
J. W. Watt, CSCO 392, Script. Syri 171 (Leuven: Secrétariat du CorpusSCO, 1978), 53-55; translation: Philoxenos of 
Mabbug: Fragments of the Commentary on Matthew and Luke, trans. by J. W. Watt, CSCO 393, Script. Syri 172 (Leuven: 
Secrétariat du CorpusSCO, 1978), 46-47. 
106 Commentary on Luke, Fragment 49; text: Commentary on Luke, 55-57; translation: Commentary on Luke, 47-48. 
107 66.258-260; M.II.245.9-11. 
108 66.411-412; M.II.249.12-13. 
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identity. It is interesting to note, though, how coy Narsai is with this argument. He never makes the 
links explicit between the body-soul relationship and Christ’s natures, but the arguments are so similar 
that it seems like his ultimate purpose in deploying this language must have been didactic in nature for 
his audience. Without giving them the explicit link, he provides them with the language and with the 
undergirding arguments that would ultimately support his christological claims. 
 As a final piece of this argument, it is worth observing that theologians in the Alexandrian/ 
miaphysite milieu also employed the body-soul relationship in their christological arguments. For 
example, in his third letter to Nestorius, Cyril of Alexandria uses language of the body-soul: 
As for our Savior’s statements in the Gospels, we do not divide them out to two subjects or 
persons. The one, unique Christ has no duality, though he is seen as compounded in 
inseparable unity out of two differing elements in the way that a human being, for example, is 
seen to have no duality but to be one, consisting of the pair of elements, body and soul.109 
Similarly, Severus of Antioch also employs the body-soul analogy: 
We are composed of body and soul, and we see two natures (kyana) the one that of the body, 
the other that of the soul; but the human being is one from the two due to the union. And the 
fact that he is composed out of two natures does not permit us to conclude that he who is one 
is two men, but rather one single man, as I have said, on account of the composition from 
body and soul.  
And the man that we are may serve us as an example. For with regard to him we comprehend 
two natures, one that of the soul and the other that of the body. However, although in subtle 
reflection we distinguish or in the imagination of the mind perceive a distinction, we still do 
not juxtapose the natures and do not allow in them the power of the separation to exhaust 
itself entirely, but we understand that they belong to a single unique being in such a way that 
from then on the two are no longer two, but through the two a single living being has been 
formed.110 
It is worth noting that Cyril and Severus make use of the exact same analogy as Theodoret and Narsai, 
yet they employ it in support of the opposite Christological conclusion, emphasizing the unity of the 
human being that is a result of the composite of body and soul. It appears, then, that this analogy 
works both ways, depending on how one describes the body-soul relationship. Is it a composite of 
two, acting as one? Or is it one entity that maintains a distinction between the two? This is, of course, 
the inherent problem with analogies: they are malleable. 
 
Conclusion 
In the preceding analysis, I have attempted to read and understand Narsai’s arguments concerning the 
body-soul relationship and the nature of the soul in his memra “On the Soul” within a broader literary 
and intellectual context. On the surface, Narsai does not engage any particular competing ideologies 
concerning the soul; however, when read in concert with other ancient and late-ancient authors, it 
becomes readily apparent that Narsai is aware of and conversant with contemporary trends in 
philosophical debates about the soul. In particular, it is illuminating to read Narsai’s claims alongside 
Nemesius, because Nemesius often provides a polemical framework within which we can see Narsai 
participating in theological debates through his homilies. In this sense, we can view Narsai’s homily 
“On the Soul” as a sort of theological catechism for his audience, training them to think correctly 
about significant theological matters without engaging directly in polemic.  
                                                
109 Cyril, “Third Letter to Nestorius,” 8, (Cyril of Aledandria: Select Letters, 22-23). 
110 Severus, Philalethes, 42; CSCO 134, 213ff; Quoted in Grillmeier, Christ in the Christian Tradition, Volume 2, 34. 
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 Throughout the homily, Narsai invites his hearers to consider the marvels of their own 
composition as an impetus to praise God. However, with the polemical context of Narsai’s claims in 
mind, it is clear that Narsai also wants his hearers to reflect on their existence as a proof of particular 
theological claims. Humans, made in God’s image, bear the likeness of their creator; thus, for Narsai—
and other authors in late antiquity—a proper understanding of human nature undergirds “orthodox” 
theology. When read within this framework, the didactic strategy of Narsai’s homily “On the Soul” 
emerges: the body-soul relationship is not merely an analogy for explaining complex theological 
arguments, it is a divine revelation which, when properly understood, reveals God’s very nature:  
P9ܹ1 ܿ5ܼܘ ܗ/ܹ0ܼ ܿ1ܼ( 3Eܵ@aܵ2 t+ܵܬܪܵܨ 3ܵV ܿDܼ(ܼ ܼܿܕ j+ ܼܿܐ  : 
܀ ܗܹܬMܼ%@Aܼ Dܼ ܿ%ܼ( 3>ܵܪ ܼܿܐܘ 3 ܵ̈% ܿEܼL j(ܵ ܢMܿq ܿ(ܼ$ܼ5ܸܕ   
As on a tablet/page, you have depicted the world in body and soul, 
so that heaven and earth might seek you through its revelation.111 
The human form is, as such, an inspired revelation, a text upon which God has inscribed the wisdom 
that leads to knowledge of God. Narsai, as master exegete, exhorts his audience to interpret this text 
correctly in order to understand the divine mysteries that God has revealed. 
                                                
111 66.355-356; M.II.247.23-248.1. 
